<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Winter CMS - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/winter-cms/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 16:49:14 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/winter-cms/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>Stored XSS in Winter CMS and October CMS Backend</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-winter-cms-xss/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 16:49:14 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-winter-cms-xss/</guid><description>Authenticated backend users can perform stored cross-site scripting (XSS) by injecting malicious content into custom CSS settings in Winter CMS and October CMS.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Winter CMS and October CMS contain a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allowing authenticated users with high-level administrative permissions to inject malicious CSS. The issue resides in the backend settings for Markup Styles and Backend Styles. When these styles are compiled via the LESS CSS parser, the resulting output is not properly sanitized before being rendered on subsequent backend pages. This allows an attacker with 'backend.manage_editor' or 'backend.manage_branding' permissions to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of other administrative sessions. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-32258 in Winter CMS and CVE-2025-61674 in October CMS. The fix involves implementing the <code>strip_tags()</code> function on the output of the <code>renderCss()</code> method.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>The vulnerability poses a risk of account takeover and unauthorized actions performed on behalf of other administrative users, including super-administrators, due to the persistent nature of the XSS payload. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to already possess specific backend management permissions, limiting the attack surface to malicious insiders or compromised administrative accounts.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade to Winter CMS v1.2.13 or later to receive the <code>strip_tags()</code> patch for <code>renderCss()</code>.</li>
<li>October CMS users should update to v3.7.13 or v4.0.12 to address the related CVE-2025-61674.</li>
<li>Audit users assigned the 'backend.manage_editor' and 'backend.manage_branding' permissions to ensure only trusted personnel retain these rights.</li>
<li>Review custom CSS and Markup Style settings in the backend for any unauthorized or suspicious injected scripts or CSS tags.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">low</category><category domain="type">advisory</category></item><item><title>Improper Input Validation in Winter CMS Backend Postback</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-winter-cms-bypass/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 16:49:07 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-winter-cms-bypass/</guid><description>Authenticated backend users can exploit an input validation vulnerability in the Winter CMS form postback mechanism to execute restricted controller methods, leading to unauthorized administrative actions.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Winter CMS contains an improper input validation vulnerability (CVE-2026-35445) affecting the form postback mechanism. The vulnerability exists because the system fails to validate the <code>_handler</code> POST field submitted during form postbacks, whereas it correctly validates the <code>X_WINTER_REQUEST_HANDLER</code> header used in AJAX requests. This flaw allows an authenticated backend user to invoke restricted methods on controllers.</p>
<p>The issue is particularly critical within the <code>Users</code> controller, where the <code>$requiredPermissions</code> property was conditionally set to <code>null</code> for the <code>myaccount</code> action. An attacker with a low-privilege backend session can chain this postback bypass with the insecure permissions check to trigger sensitive administrative methods - including user deletion, restoration, and password resets - despite lacking the <code>backend.manage_users</code> permission. All major versions of Winter CMS (1.0, 1.1, and 1.2) were vulnerable prior to version 1.2.13.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows authenticated backend users to escalate privileges and perform unauthorized administrative actions, including user deletion, restoration, and forced password resets, bypassing existing role-based access control (RBAC) configurations. This impacts the integrity and availability of user accounts and the overall security of the Winter CMS backend.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade to Winter CMS version 1.2.13 or later to receive the core patch which enforces validation on the <code>_handler</code> POST field.</li>
<li>If an immediate upgrade is not possible, apply the following manual workarounds:</li>
<li>Modify <code>modules/backend/classes/Controller.php</code> to validate the <code>_handler</code> POST field against the <code>on[A-Z][\w+]*</code> pattern before passing it to <code>runAjaxHandler()</code>.</li>
<li>Update <code>modules/backend/controllers/Users.php</code> to remove the conditional logic that sets <code>$requiredPermissions</code> to <code>null</code> for the <code>myaccount</code> action.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>web-application</category><category>privilege-escalation</category><category>cms</category></item></channel></rss>