{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/sophos/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Windows Filtering Platform","elastic-agent","elastic-endpoint"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["defense-evasion","windows-filtering-platform","endpoint-security"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","Bitdefender","VMware Carbon Black","Comodo","Vectra AI","Cybereason","Cylance","Elastic","ESET","Broadcom","Fortinet","Kaspersky","Malwarebytes","McAfee","Qualys","SentinelOne","Sophos","Symantec","Trend Micro","BeyondTrust","CrowdStrike","Splunk","Tanium"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) provides APIs and system services for network filtering and packet processing. Attackers can abuse WFP by creating malicious rules to block endpoint security processes, hindering their ability to send telemetry. This can be achieved by tools like Shutter, EDRSilencer, and Nighthawk. This detection rule identifies patterns of blocked network events linked to security software processes, signaling potential evasion tactics. The rule specifically looks for blocked network events linked to processes associated with known security software, aiming to detect and alert on attempts to disable or modify security tools. This behavior is especially concerning as it allows attackers to operate with reduced visibility.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker gains initial access to the target system (e.g., via compromised credentials or exploiting a vulnerability).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker escalates privileges to gain administrative rights, necessary to interact with the Windows Filtering Platform.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses a tool or script (e.g., leveraging the \u003ccode\u003enetsh\u003c/code\u003e command or custom WFP API calls) to create a new WFP filter.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe WFP filter is configured to block network traffic originating from specific processes associated with endpoint security software (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eelastic-agent.exe\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003esysmon.exe\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe system begins blocking network communication from the targeted security software.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker executes malicious commands or malware on the system, knowing that security telemetry will be suppressed.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker moves laterally within the network, repeating the WFP filter deployment on other systems to further impair defenses.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves their final objective, such as data exfiltration or ransomware deployment, with reduced risk of detection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack using WFP to impair defenses can lead to a significant reduction in the effectiveness of endpoint security solutions. This can result in delayed detection of malicious activities, increased dwell time for attackers, and ultimately, a higher likelihood of successful data breaches or ransomware attacks. With endpoint telemetry blocked, organizations may remain unaware of the ongoing compromise until significant damage has occurred. The number of affected systems can vary depending on the attacker\u0026rsquo;s scope and objectives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable and review Windows Audit Filtering Platform Connection and Packet Drop events to populate the logs required for the provided EQL rule (logs-system.security*, logs-windows.forwarded*, winlogbeat-*).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the provided EQL rule to your SIEM to detect suspicious WFP modifications and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the EQL rule, focusing on identifying the specific processes being blocked and the source of the WFP rule modifications.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRegularly review and audit WFP rules to identify any unauthorized or suspicious entries.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement strict access controls and monitoring for systems authorized to modify WFP rules.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-05-04T14:17:05Z","date_published":"2026-05-04T14:17:05Z","id":"/briefs/2026-05-wfp-evasion/","summary":"Adversaries may add malicious Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) rules to prevent endpoint security solutions from sending telemetry data, impairing defenses, which this rule detects by identifying multiple WFP block events where the process name is associated with endpoint security software.","title":"Potential Evasion via Windows Filtering Platform Blocking Security Software","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-wfp-evasion/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Endpoint Defense","Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection","Symantec Endpoint Protection","Endpoint Security","AVDefender","Optics","Padvish AV"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["credential-access","regback","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Elastic","Sophos","Microsoft","Trend Micro","Symantec","Bitdefender","N-able Technologies","Cylance","McAfee","Padvish"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection identifies suspicious attempts to access registry backup hives (SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM) located in the \u003ccode\u003eRegBack\u003c/code\u003e folder on Windows systems. These hives contain sensitive credential material, making them attractive targets for attackers seeking to compromise system security. The detection logic focuses on file access events, specifically successful file opens, while excluding known benign processes such as \u003ccode\u003etaskhostw.exe\u003c/code\u003e and various AV/EDR solutions (SophosScanCoordinator.exe, MsSense.exe, ccSvcHst.exe, etc.) to minimize false positives. The rule is designed to provide defenders with high-fidelity alerts when unauthorized access to these critical registry hives is detected. The scope includes any Windows system where endpoint file access logging is enabled.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to the system through various means.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker attempts to access the \u003ccode\u003eSAM\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eSECURITY\u003c/code\u003e, or \u003ccode\u003eSYSTEM\u003c/code\u003e registry hives located in the \u003ccode\u003eC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\RegBack\\\\\u003c/code\u003e directory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages a tool or script to open one or more of these registry hives. This could involve using built-in Windows utilities, scripting languages, or custom-developed tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf the attacker successfully opens the \u003ccode\u003eSAM\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eSYSTEM\u003c/code\u003e hives, they can extract user account credentials, including usernames, password hashes, and other sensitive information. The \u003ccode\u003eSECURITY\u003c/code\u003e hive is also useful.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker may stage the registry hive files by copying them to a different location on the system for further analysis or exfiltration.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses credential dumping tools (e.g., Mimikatz, secretsdump.py) or custom scripts to extract credentials from the staged registry hives.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages the extracted credentials to escalate privileges, move laterally within the network, or access sensitive data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe final objective is typically to gain unauthorized access to critical systems, steal sensitive data, or establish long-term persistence within the compromised environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of this technique can lead to the compromise of user account credentials, enabling attackers to escalate privileges, move laterally within the network, and gain unauthorized access to sensitive data. The impact can range from data breaches and financial losses to reputational damage and disruption of critical business operations. The number of victims can vary depending on the scope of the attacker\u0026rsquo;s activities and the security posture of the targeted organization. Sectors commonly targeted include finance, healthcare, government, and critical infrastructure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable file access monitoring for the \u003ccode\u003eC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\RegBack\\\\\u003c/code\u003e directory to capture file open events.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eRegistry Hive Access via RegBack\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune the exclusions based on your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor \u003ccode\u003eprocess_creation\u003c/code\u003e events for unusual processes accessing files in \u003ccode\u003eC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\RegBack\\\\\u003c/code\u003e, using the rule \u003ccode\u003eSuspicious Process Accessing RegBack Hives\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging and file creation to activate the rules above.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-07-02T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-07-02T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-07-regback-hive-access/","summary":"This rule detects attempts to access registry backup hives (SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM) via RegBack on Windows systems, which can contain or enable access to credential material.","title":"Suspicious Registry Hive Access via RegBack","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-07-regback-hive-access/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Windows"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["credential-access","lsass","dll-injection","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","McAfee","SecMaker AB","HID Global","Apple","Citrix Systems","Dell","Hewlett-Packard Company","Symantec Corporation","National Instruments Corporation","DigitalPersona","Novell","Gemalto","EasyAntiCheat Oy","Entrust Datacard Corporation","AuriStor","LogMeIn","VMware","Nubeva Technologies Ltd","Micro Focus","Yubico AB","Secure Endpoints","Sophos","Morphisec Information Security","Entrust","F5 Networks","Bit4id","Thales DIS CPL USA","Micro Focus International plc","HYPR Corp","Intel","PGP Corporation","Parallels International GmbH","FrontRange Solutions Deutschland GmbH","SecureLink","Tidexa OU","Amazon Web Services","SentryBay Limited","Audinate Pty Ltd","CyberArk Software","NVIDIA","Trend Micro","Fortinet","Carbon Black"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) is a critical Windows component that manages security policies and user authentication. Attackers often target LSASS to dump credentials, using techniques like injecting malicious DLLs. This detection focuses on identifying instances where LSASS loads a DLL that is either unsigned or not signed by a trusted vendor. The rule excludes known legitimate signatures and file hashes to reduce false positives. This activity is a strong indicator of credential access attempts, potentially leading to further compromise of the system and network. The signatures identified in the rule contain well-known software vendors like Microsoft, McAfee and Citrix.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to the system through various means (e.g., phishing, exploiting a vulnerability).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker elevates privileges to gain sufficient access to interact with the LSASS process.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker drops a malicious DLL onto the system, often disguised as a legitimate file.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker injects the malicious DLL into the LSASS process using techniques like Reflective DLL Injection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLSASS loads the injected DLL, granting the attacker access to sensitive credentials stored in memory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe malicious DLL dumps credentials, such as plaintext passwords or NTLM hashes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the stolen credentials for lateral movement to other systems on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves their final objective, such as data exfiltration or deploying ransomware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation leads to credential compromise, allowing attackers to move laterally within the network, access sensitive data, and potentially achieve complete domain dominance. This can result in data breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage. The impact depends on the level of access associated with the compromised credentials.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the \u003ccode\u003eLSASS Loading Untrusted DLL\u003c/code\u003e Sigma rule to your SIEM to detect suspicious DLLs loaded by LSASS.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule and review the loaded DLL\u0026rsquo;s code signature and hash.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBlock the identified SHA256 hashes listed in the IOC table to prevent the execution of known malicious DLLs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement application whitelisting to restrict which DLLs can be loaded into LSASS.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation and image load logging to provide the necessary data for detection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T10:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T10:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-lsass-suspicious-dll/","summary":"Detection of LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL, which can indicate credential access attempts by malicious actors targeting sensitive information stored in the LSASS process.","title":"LSASS Loading Suspicious DLL","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-lsass-suspicious-dll/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Sophos","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}