{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/nvidia/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["@jupyter-notebook/help-extension","notebook","jupyterlab","@jupyterlab/help-extension","Jupyter Notebook"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["xss","jupyter","authentication","account-takeover","vulnerability"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Jupyter","NVIDIA"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eA stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab, impacting versions 7.0.0 through 7.5.5 of Jupyter Notebook and versions up to 4.5.6 of JupyterLab. Discovered by Daniel Teixeira of the NVIDIA AI Red Team, this flaw allows an attacker to craft malicious notebook files containing XSS payloads embedded within the command linker functionality. When a user opens and interacts with these files, the injected script executes, potentially stealing the user\u0026rsquo;s authentication token. Successful exploitation grants the attacker full control over the user\u0026rsquo;s Jupyter account, enabling them to read, modify, and create files, execute arbitrary code via running kernels, and establish shell access through created terminals. This vulnerability poses a significant risk to data confidentiality, integrity, and system availability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker crafts a malicious Jupyter Notebook file containing a stored XSS payload within the command linker functionality.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker distributes the malicious notebook file to a target user (e.g., via email, shared repository, or compromised website).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe victim opens the malicious notebook file in a vulnerable version of Jupyter Notebook or JupyterLab.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe victim interacts with a seemingly legitimate control element within the notebook that is, in fact, part of the XSS payload.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe injected XSS code executes in the victim\u0026rsquo;s browser, stealing their authentication token.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the stolen authentication token to authenticate to the Jupyter REST API.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker gains complete control over the victim\u0026rsquo;s Jupyter account.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker performs malicious actions, such as reading files, modifying files, executing arbitrary code, or creating terminals for shell access.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of this XSS vulnerability enables complete account takeover, allowing attackers to read, modify, and create files, access running kernels and execute arbitrary code, and create terminals for shell access within the victim\u0026rsquo;s Jupyter environment. This can lead to data exfiltration, code injection, and potential compromise of sensitive information stored within the Jupyter Notebook environment. Given the widespread use of Jupyter Notebook in data science, machine learning, and research environments, this vulnerability can have far-reaching consequences for individuals and organizations relying on these tools.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImmediately upgrade Jupyter Notebook to version 7.5.6 or later, and JupyterLab to version 4.5.7 or later to patch CVE-2026-40171.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eApply the workaround to disable the help extension via CLI as specified in the advisory to mitigate the vulnerability until patching is possible.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement the hardening measure by disabling the command linker functionality via \u003ccode\u003eoverrides.json\u003c/code\u003e to prevent XSS attacks, referencing the configuration details in the advisory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Detect Jupyter Notebook CommandLinker XSS Attempt\u0026rdquo; to detect potential exploitation attempts based on specific HTTP request characteristics.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEducate users about the risks of opening untrusted Jupyter Notebook files and interacting with potentially malicious content.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-04-30T17:25:47Z","date_published":"2026-04-30T17:25:47Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-30-jupyter-xss/","summary":"A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Jupyter Notebook versions 7.0.0 through 7.5.5 and JupyterLab versions up to 4.5.6 allows attackers to steal authentication tokens by tricking users into interacting with malicious notebook files, leading to complete account takeover via the Jupyter REST API.","title":"Jupyter Notebook Authentication Token Theft via CommandLinker XSS","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-30-jupyter-xss/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Microsoft Windows","Microsoft Defender XDR","Commvault","Nvidia Display Driver","Elastic Defend","SentinelOne Cloud Funnel","CrowdStrike FDR"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["persistence","defense-evasion","appinit-dlls","registry","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","Commvault","Nvidia","Elastic","Crowdstrike","SentinelOne"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe AppInit DLLs mechanism allows dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) to be loaded into every process that creates a user interface (loads user32.dll) on Microsoft Windows operating systems. This mechanism is intended for customization of the user interface and behavior of Windows-based applications. However, attackers can abuse this by adding malicious DLLs to the registry locations associated with AppInit DLLs. This enables them to execute code with elevated privileges, similar to process injection, and maintain a persistent presence on the compromised machine. This technique is often used to maintain access after initial compromise. Detection focuses on registry modifications to the relevant keys, excluding known legitimate processes to minimize false positives. The referenced Elastic rule was last updated on 2026/05/04.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to the system through a vulnerability, phishing, or other means.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker identifies the AppInit DLLs registry keys: \u003ccode\u003eHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker modifies the \u003ccode\u003eAppInit_DLLs\u003c/code\u003e registry value to include the path to their malicious DLL.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker\u0026rsquo;s DLL is placed on the filesystem, typically in a location where it will persist across reboots.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAny new process that loads user32.dll will automatically load the attacker\u0026rsquo;s malicious DLL.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe malicious DLL executes arbitrary code within the context of the newly created process.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker can use this code execution to perform further actions, such as installing backdoors or escalating privileges.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker maintains persistent access to the system through the malicious DLL loaded into every user interface process.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary code within the context of any process that loads \u003ccode\u003euser32.dll\u003c/code\u003e. This provides a persistent mechanism for maintaining access to the compromised system. The attacker gains code execution with elevated privileges, similar to process injection. This can lead to data theft, system compromise, or further lateral movement within the network. While no specific victim counts are mentioned, the widespread use of Windows makes this a potentially high-impact vulnerability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor registry modifications to the \u003ccode\u003eAppInit_DLLs\u003c/code\u003e value in \u003ccode\u003eHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\u003c/code\u003e using the \u0026ldquo;Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL Modification\u0026rdquo; Sigma rule.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon registry event logging to provide the data required for the Sigma rule to function correctly.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the \u0026ldquo;Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL Modification\u0026rdquo; Sigma rule to your SIEM and tune the filter to exclude known-good DLL paths in your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts triggered by the Sigma rule, focusing on the parent process and the DLL being loaded.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-appinit-dll-persistence/","summary":"Modification of the AppInit DLLs registry keys on Windows systems allows attackers to execute code in every process that loads user32.dll, establishing persistence and potentially escalating privileges.","title":"Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL Modification","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-appinit-dll-persistence/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Windows"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["credential-access","lsass","dll-injection","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","McAfee","SecMaker AB","HID Global","Apple","Citrix Systems","Dell","Hewlett-Packard Company","Symantec Corporation","National Instruments Corporation","DigitalPersona","Novell","Gemalto","EasyAntiCheat Oy","Entrust Datacard Corporation","AuriStor","LogMeIn","VMware","Nubeva Technologies Ltd","Micro Focus","Yubico AB","Secure Endpoints","Sophos","Morphisec Information Security","Entrust","F5 Networks","Bit4id","Thales DIS CPL USA","Micro Focus International plc","HYPR Corp","Intel","PGP Corporation","Parallels International GmbH","FrontRange Solutions Deutschland GmbH","SecureLink","Tidexa OU","Amazon Web Services","SentryBay Limited","Audinate Pty Ltd","CyberArk Software","NVIDIA","Trend Micro","Fortinet","Carbon Black"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) is a critical Windows component that manages security policies and user authentication. Attackers often target LSASS to dump credentials, using techniques like injecting malicious DLLs. This detection focuses on identifying instances where LSASS loads a DLL that is either unsigned or not signed by a trusted vendor. The rule excludes known legitimate signatures and file hashes to reduce false positives. This activity is a strong indicator of credential access attempts, potentially leading to further compromise of the system and network. The signatures identified in the rule contain well-known software vendors like Microsoft, McAfee and Citrix.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to the system through various means (e.g., phishing, exploiting a vulnerability).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker elevates privileges to gain sufficient access to interact with the LSASS process.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker drops a malicious DLL onto the system, often disguised as a legitimate file.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker injects the malicious DLL into the LSASS process using techniques like Reflective DLL Injection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLSASS loads the injected DLL, granting the attacker access to sensitive credentials stored in memory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe malicious DLL dumps credentials, such as plaintext passwords or NTLM hashes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the stolen credentials for lateral movement to other systems on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves their final objective, such as data exfiltration or deploying ransomware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation leads to credential compromise, allowing attackers to move laterally within the network, access sensitive data, and potentially achieve complete domain dominance. This can result in data breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage. The impact depends on the level of access associated with the compromised credentials.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the \u003ccode\u003eLSASS Loading Untrusted DLL\u003c/code\u003e Sigma rule to your SIEM to detect suspicious DLLs loaded by LSASS.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule and review the loaded DLL\u0026rsquo;s code signature and hash.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBlock the identified SHA256 hashes listed in the IOC table to prevent the execution of known malicious DLLs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement application whitelisting to restrict which DLLs can be loaded into LSASS.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation and image load logging to provide the necessary data for detection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T10:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T10:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-lsass-suspicious-dll/","summary":"Detection of LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL, which can indicate credential access attempts by malicious actors targeting sensitive information stored in the LSASS process.","title":"LSASS Loading Suspicious DLL","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-lsass-suspicious-dll/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Nvidia","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}