Attack Chain

1. Craft Malicious Pickle Payload: An attacker crafts a Python pickle file (.pkl) embedding arbitrary code, specifically utilizing lib2to3.pgen2.grammar.Grammar.loads within the __reduce__ method to achieve RCE.
2. Evade Security Scanner: The crafted malicious payload is designed to exploit the flaw in picklescan versions prior to 0.0.29, allowing it to bypass its detection mechanisms.
3. Delivery of Malicious File: The attacker delivers the malicious pickle file to a target system. This could occur via various vectors, such as uploading to a vulnerable web application, attaching it to a phishing email, or injecting it into a compromised software supply chain.
4. Target Application Processes Pickle File: A vulnerable application on the target system receives and attempts to deserialize the seemingly benign (undetected by picklescan) malicious pickle file using Python's pickle.load() function.
5. Deserialization and Code Execution: During the deserialization process, the __reduce__ method within the pickle object is invoked, and the embedded Grammar.loads executes the attacker's arbitrary code.
6. Remote Code Execution (RCE): The attacker's code runs with the privileges of the vulnerable application, leading to remote code execution on the target system.

Impact

Successful exploitation of CVE-2025-71359 results in remote code execution (RCE) on the host system where the vulnerable picklescan library is used to validate and subsequently deserialize malicious pickle files. This level of access allows attackers to take complete control of the affected application and potentially the underlying server. Consequences can include unauthorized data access, modification, or deletion, installation of malware (e.g., ransomware, backdoors), lateral movement within the network, and complete system compromise. The severity of the impact depends on the privileges of the compromised application and the data it processes.

Recommendation

• Immediately update picklescan to version 0.0.29 or newer to remediate CVE-2025-71359.
• Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all incoming pickle files, regardless of picklescan usage.
• Adopt secure deserialization practices by never deserializing untrusted data. If deserialization is unavoidable, implement restricted unpickling environments, such as those that limit available classes and functions during pickle.load().