{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/manageengine/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Microsoft Defender XDR","SentinelOne Cloud Funnel","Elastic Defend","CCleaner","ManageEngine UEMS Agent","ManageEngine DesktopCentral Agent"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["persistence","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","ManageEngine","CCleaner","Elastic","SentinelOne"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eAdversaries may abuse scheduled tasks to maintain persistence on a compromised system. This involves creating or modifying scheduled tasks to execute malicious code at specific times or intervals. This activity can be used to ensure that the attacker\u0026rsquo;s code remains active even after a system restart or user logout. The detection rule identifies suspicious job creation by monitoring specific file paths and extensions, excluding known legitimate processes to flag potential abuse. The rule is designed for data generated by Elastic Defend, but also supports Microsoft Defender XDR, SentinelOne Cloud Funnel, and Sysmon.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to a Windows system (e.g., via phishing or exploiting a vulnerability).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker attempts to establish persistence.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses a script or program to create a new scheduled job within the \u003ccode\u003eC:\\Windows\\Tasks\\\u003c/code\u003e directory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe scheduled job is configured to execute a malicious payload at a specified time or interval.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe malicious payload could be a script (e.g., PowerShell) or an executable.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe scheduled job executes, triggering the malicious payload.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker maintains persistent access to the system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker performs malicious activities, such as data exfiltration or lateral movement.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to maintain a persistent presence on the compromised system. This allows them to execute malicious code, steal sensitive information, or perform other malicious activities over an extended period. The number of affected systems can vary depending on the scope of the initial compromise and the attacker\u0026rsquo;s objectives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create) logging to monitor file creation events on Windows systems.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Detect Suspicious Scheduled Job Creation\u0026rdquo; to your SIEM and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule, focusing on scheduled jobs created in the \u003ccode\u003eC:\\Windows\\Tasks\\\u003c/code\u003e directory with a \u0026ldquo;.job\u0026rdquo; extension.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and update exclusion lists for known legitimate scheduled job creation processes (e.g., CCleaner, ManageEngine) to minimize false positives.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-09T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-09T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-09-scheduled-job-persistence/","summary":"This detection rule identifies attempts to establish persistence on Windows systems by creating scheduled jobs in the Windows Tasks directory, excluding known legitimate jobs.","title":"Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-09-scheduled-job-persistence/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Defender XDR","Endpoint Security","UEMS_Agent","SentinelOne Cloud Funnel"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["defense-evasion","filter-driver","fltMC.exe","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","ManageEngine","Bitdefender","SentinelOne"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) is a Windows utility used to manage filter drivers, also known as minifilters. These minifilters are leveraged by various security products, including EDR, antivirus solutions, and data loss prevention tools, to intercept and modify I/O requests. Attackers can abuse fltMC.exe to unload these minifilters, effectively disabling or circumventing the security measures they provide. This allows malicious actors to operate without detection, potentially leading to data breaches, malware infections, or other harmful activities. This technique has been observed being used to disable security products such as Bitdefender, SentinelOne and ManageEngine Endpoint Central.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker gains initial access to the target system (e.g., via compromised credentials or exploit).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker executes \u003ccode\u003efltMC.exe\u003c/code\u003e with administrative privileges.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003efltMC.exe\u003c/code\u003e attempts to unload a specific filter driver (minifilter).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe operating system processes the request to unload the specified filter driver.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf successful, the targeted minifilter is removed from the active filter stack.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSecurity software relying on the unloaded minifilter ceases to function correctly, leaving a security gap.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker performs malicious actions, such as deploying malware or exfiltrating sensitive data, without the protection of the disabled filter driver.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker achieves their objective, such as data theft or system compromise.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to disable or circumvent security controls, increasing the likelihood of successful malware infections, data breaches, and other malicious activities. The scope of impact depends on the specific filter driver unloaded and the security products it supports. Disabling a critical EDR minifilter could leave the entire system vulnerable, while disabling a less critical filter might only impact a subset of security features.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor process creation events for the execution of \u003ccode\u003efltMC.exe\u003c/code\u003e with the \u003ccode\u003eunload\u003c/code\u003e argument to identify potential evasion attempts (see Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Potential Evasion via Filter Manager\u0026rdquo;).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any instances of \u003ccode\u003efltMC.exe\u003c/code\u003e execution where the parent process is not a known and trusted system management tool.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement strict access controls to limit the ability of users to execute \u003ccode\u003efltMC.exe\u003c/code\u003e or modify filter driver configurations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview the list of exclusions in the provided EQL query to identify any legitimate software that may be generating false positives.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnsure that endpoint security solutions are properly configured and monitored to detect and prevent unauthorized filter driver modifications.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging to activate the rules above.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T14:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T14:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-filter-manager-evasion/","summary":"Adversaries may abuse the Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) to unload filter drivers, thereby evading security software defenses such as malware detection and file system monitoring.","title":"Potential Defense Evasion via Filter Manager (fltMC.exe)","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-filter-manager-evasion/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","AteraAgent","AweSun","APC Admin","APC Host","BeyondTrust Remote Support","Bomgar","Remote Support","B4-Service","CagService","Domotz Agent","dwagsvc","DWRCC","FleetDeck Commander","GetScreen","GoToAssist","GoToResolve","ImperoClient","ImperoServer","ISLLight","ISLLightClient","JumpCloud Agent","Level","LvAgent","LMIIgnition","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine Remote Access Plus","MeshAgent","Mikogo","NinjaRMM","parsec","PService","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","RemoteDesktopManager","RCClient","RCService","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","saazapsc","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","Syncro","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["remote-access-tool","command-and-control","rmm","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","Atera","AweSun","APC","BeyondTrust","BarracudaRMM","Domotz","DWService","FleetDeck","GetScreen","GoTo","Impero","ISLOnline","JumpCloud","Level","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine","MeshCentral","Mikogo","NinjaOne","Parsec","Pulseway","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","Devolutions","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","Kaseya","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies Windows systems running multiple Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools from different vendors within an eight-minute timeframe. While legitimate MSP environments might utilize several tools, the presence of multiple RMM solutions on a single host can signify a compromise, unauthorized software installation (shadow IT), or attackers establishing redundant access points. The rule maps process names to vendor labels to avoid inflated counts from multiple binaries of the same vendor. This activity has been observed as a component of broader attack campaigns, including those leveraging compromised MSP infrastructure, and is described in CISA AA23-025A. The timeframe analyzed is \u0026ldquo;now-9m\u0026rdquo;, and the rule triggers if two or more different vendors are detected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInitial Access: The attacker gains initial access to the system, possibly through phishing, exploiting vulnerabilities, or stolen credentials.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTool Deployment: The attacker deploys an initial RMM tool (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) for remote access and control.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePersistence: The attacker establishes persistence by configuring the RMM tool to start automatically on system boot.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLateral Movement: The attacker uses the initial access to discover other systems on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAdditional RMM Deployment: The attacker deploys a second RMM tool (e.g., ScreenConnect, Splashtop) from a different vendor to create a redundant access method.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePrivilege Escalation: The attacker escalates privileges using the compromised RMM tools, if necessary.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRemote Control: The attacker uses the RMM tools to remotely control the system, execute commands, and access sensitive data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eData Exfiltration or Further Exploitation: The attacker exfiltrates sensitive data or uses the compromised system to launch further attacks on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack leveraging multiple RMM tools can result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, system compromise, and lateral movement within the network. The presence of multiple RMM tools increases the attacker\u0026rsquo;s resilience, making it harder to detect and remediate the intrusion. Affected systems can be used as a staging ground for further attacks, leading to significant financial and reputational damage. This can impact any Windows-based system, and the CISA advisory AA23-025A specifically highlights the risk of MSP infrastructure compromise.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eMultiple RMM Vendors on Same Host\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate hosts triggering the rule to confirm legitimate use of multiple RMM tools. Check \u003ccode\u003eEsql.vendors_seen\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eEsql.processes_name_values\u003c/code\u003e for insight into the involved tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview asset inventory and change tickets to verify authorized RMM software installations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIsolate any unauthorized or unexplained hosts and remove unapproved RMM tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnforce a single approved RMM stack per asset class where possible.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) on Windows endpoints to enhance detection capabilities as described in the rule\u0026rsquo;s setup instructions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-multiple-rmm-vendors/","summary":"This rule identifies Windows hosts where two or more distinct remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote-access tool vendors are observed starting processes within the same eight-minute window, potentially indicating compromise, shadow IT, or attacker staging of redundant access.","title":"Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-multiple-rmm-vendors/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","Atera Agent","AweSun","APC Admin","APC Host","BeyondTrust","Remote Support","BarracudaRMM","Domotz Agent","DWService","FleetDeck Commander","GetScreen","GoTo","Impero Client","Impero Server","ISLLight","ISLLightClient","JumpCloud Agent","Level","LvAgent","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine Remote Access Plus","MeshAgent","Mikogo","NinjaRMMAgent","NinjaRMMAgenPatcher","ninjarmm-cli","Parsec","Pulseway","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","RemoteDesktopManager","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","Kaseya","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","SyncroLive","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["command-and-control","rmm","windows","threat-detection"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","Atera","AweSun","APC","BeyondTrust","BarracudaRMM","Domotz","DWService","FleetDeck","GetScreen","GoTo","Impero","ISLOnline","JumpCloud","Level","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine","MeshCentral","Mikogo","NinjaOne","Parsec","Pulseway","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","Devolutions","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","Kaseya","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies Windows hosts running multiple remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools from different vendors within an eight-minute timeframe. While legitimate MSP environments may utilize multiple tools, this activity can also indicate malicious behavior, such as an attacker establishing redundant access to a compromised system. The rule maps various RMM processes to vendor labels, ensuring that multiple binaries from the same vendor do not inflate the count. The processes monitored include popular RMM tools like TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and many others. This rule is designed to detect suspicious activity within the environment and alert security teams to potential compromises. The timeframe is set to eight minutes to reduce false positives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInitial Access: An attacker gains initial access to a Windows host, possibly through phishing or exploitation of a vulnerability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTool Deployment: The attacker deploys an initial RMM tool for remote access and control.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSecondary Tool Deployment: The attacker deploys a second RMM tool from a different vendor to ensure redundant access in case the first tool is detected or removed.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePrivilege Escalation: The attacker escalates privileges to gain SYSTEM or Administrator rights, if necessary, to maintain persistent access and control.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLateral Movement: The attacker uses the RMM tools to move laterally within the network to access additional systems and data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eData Exfiltration/Malicious Activity: The attacker uses the established RMM connections to exfiltrate sensitive data or perform other malicious activities such as deploying ransomware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, potentially resulting in data breaches, financial loss, and reputational damage. This detection rule helps identify hosts that might be compromised by malicious actors utilizing multiple RMM tools for command and control. Identifying potentially compromised systems is key to preventing widespread damage.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rules in this brief to your SIEM to detect multiple RMM tools running on the same host within an eight-minute window.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate systems triggering this alert by reviewing process execution logs and network connections to identify the source of the RMM tool installation.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnforce a policy of a single approved RMM stack per asset class to minimize the risk of unauthorized RMM tool usage.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTune the provided Sigma rules with host or organizational unit exceptions for legitimate MSP/IT tooling environments.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview asset inventory and change tickets for approved RMM software to identify unauthorized installations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-02T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-02T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-02-multiple-rmm-vendors/","summary":"This detection identifies a Windows host where two or more distinct remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote-access tool vendors are observed starting processes within the same eight-minute window, potentially indicating compromise, shadow IT, or attacker staging of redundant access.","title":"Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-02-multiple-rmm-vendors/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — ManageEngine","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}