{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","favicon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.png","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/jdx/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","icon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/apple-touch-icon.png","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:jdx:mise:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*"],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":7.7,"id":"CVE-2026-35533"},{"cvss":6.3,"id":"CVE-2026-55448"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":[],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["mise","trust-bypass","code-execution","vulnerability"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["jdx"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eA critical vulnerability exists in the mise tool (versions 2026.2.18 through 2026.4.5) where local project configuration files (.mise.toml) are loaded \u003cem\u003ebefore\u003c/em\u003e trust checks are performed. This allows an attacker who can influence the contents of a repository (e.g., through a pull request or direct commit) to inject malicious configurations that bypass intended trust restrictions. Specifically, an attacker can set \u003ccode\u003etrusted_config_paths = [\u0026quot;/\u0026quot;]\u003c/code\u003e within a crafted .mise.toml, which effectively trusts all configuration files, including the malicious one. This bypass then permits the execution of dangerous directives, such as arbitrary shell commands via \u003ccode\u003e[env] _.source\u003c/code\u003e, leading to potential system compromise. This vulnerability undermines the security model of mise by subverting the trust mechanism designed to prevent unauthorized code execution.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains the ability to modify a repository containing a mise project. This could be via a compromised account, a malicious pull request, or other means.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker creates or modifies a \u003ccode\u003e.mise.toml\u003c/code\u003e file within the repository, adding the following lines:\n\u003cdiv class=\"highlight\"\u003e\u003cpre tabindex=\"0\" class=\"chroma\"\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-toml\" data-lang=\"toml\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"line\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e[\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"nx\"\u003esettings\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e]\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"line\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"nx\"\u003etrusted_config_paths\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e=\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e[\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"s2\"\u003e\u0026#34;/\u0026#34;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e]\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"line\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cl\"\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"line\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e[\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"nx\"\u003eenv\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e]\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"line\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"nx\"\u003e_\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"nx\"\u003esource\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e=\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e[\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"s2\"\u003e\u0026#34;./poc.sh\u0026#34;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"p\"\u003e]\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker creates or modifies a file \u003ccode\u003epoc.sh\u003c/code\u003e containing the malicious commands to be executed. For example:\n\u003cdiv class=\"highlight\"\u003e\u003cpre tabindex=\"0\" class=\"chroma\"\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\" data-lang=\"bash\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"line\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cp\"\u003e#!/usr/bin/env bash\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"line\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"cl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"nb\"\u003eecho\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"s2\"\u003e\u0026#34;Exploited!\u0026#34;\u003c/span\u003e \u0026gt; /tmp/pwned.txt\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA user clones the repository and navigates to the project directory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe user executes the command \u003ccode\u003emise hook-env -s bash --force\u003c/code\u003e. This command is intended to set up the environment based on the \u003ccode\u003e.mise.toml\u003c/code\u003e configuration.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBecause \u003ccode\u003etrusted_config_paths\u003c/code\u003e is set to \u003ccode\u003e/\u003c/code\u003e, the \u003ccode\u003e.mise.toml\u003c/code\u003e file is considered trusted and the \u003ccode\u003e[env] _.source\u003c/code\u003e directive is executed.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003epoc.sh\u003c/code\u003e script is executed, resulting in arbitrary code execution. In this example, the \u003ccode\u003e/tmp/pwned.txt\u003c/code\u003e file is created containing \u0026quot;Exploited!\u0026quot;.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker has achieved arbitrary code execution on the user's system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the victim's machine. The number of potential victims is equal to the number of users who clone and use a repository containing the malicious \u003ccode\u003e.mise.toml\u003c/code\u003e file and are using a vulnerable version of \u003ccode\u003emise\u003c/code\u003e (2026.2.18 - 2026.4.5). The impact ranges from data theft and system compromise to complete control of the affected system, depending on the commands executed by the attacker's script. Organizations using mise for environment management are particularly at risk.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade to a patched version of \u003ccode\u003emise\u003c/code\u003e greater than 2026.4.5 to address CVE-2026-35533.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eDetect Mise Hook-Env with Dot Source\u003c/code\u003e to identify potential exploitation attempts based on the \u003ccode\u003emise hook-env\u003c/code\u003e command.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor for the creation of unexpected files (e.g., in /tmp) after the execution of \u003ccode\u003emise hook-env\u003c/code\u003e commands.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement code review processes to prevent the introduction of malicious \u003ccode\u003e.mise.toml\u003c/code\u003e files into repositories.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-10-15T22:24:17Z","date_published":"2026-04-07T20:13:11Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-mise-trust-bypass/","summary":"A vulnerability in mise allows an attacker who can place a malicious .mise.toml file in a repository to bypass trust checks and execute arbitrary code via `[env] _.source` due to improper loading of trust settings.","title":"Mise Trust Bypass Vulnerability via Malicious .mise.toml","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-mise-trust-bypass/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Jdx","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}