INDI - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/indi/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioMon, 17 Aug 2026 18:50:15 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.pngCraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/3232https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svgStack Buffer Overflow in INDI indiserverhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-indi-overflow/Mon, 17 Aug 2026 18:50:15 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-indi-overflow/An unauthenticated remote attacker can crash the INDI indiserver daemon via a stack-based buffer overflow triggered by malformed XML input containing excessively long tags.INDI (Instrument Neutral Distributed Interface) indiserver through version 2.2.4.2 is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow in MsgQueue.cpp. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger this condition by sending a single malformed TCP packet to the default port 7624. The vulnerability arises from an unbounded sprintf() operation that writes user-supplied XML tag names into a fixed 1024-byte stack buffer. When the tag name exceeds this length, the overflow corrupts the stack, leading to immediate daemon termination. This flaw was addressed in commit 96bbd7f. Given the role of indiserver in telescope control and observatory automation, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to the availability of astronomical instrument control systems.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker performs reconnaissance to identify systems running indiserver listening on TCP port 7624.
  2. Attacker initiates a TCP connection to the target indiserver instance.
  3. Attacker crafts a custom XML payload containing a tag name field greater than 1024 bytes.
  4. Attacker sends the malformed XML payload within a single TCP packet to the established socket.
  5. The indiserver process receives the packet and passes the data to the parser in MsgQueue.cpp.
  6. The sprintf() function executes, performing an unbounded copy of the tag string into the stack buffer.
  7. The stack-based buffer overflow occurs, corrupting the execution stack and triggering a crash.
  8. The daemon service terminates, resulting in a denial-of-service for all connected clients and controlled drivers.

Impact

Successful exploitation results in a complete denial-of-service of the indiserver daemon. Because the service manages the communication interface between control software and hardware drivers, a crash terminates all active sessions, disrupts data acquisition, and halts ongoing astronomical observations. The attack requires no authentication and can be performed remotely against any exposed instance.

Recommendation

  • Update indiserver to a version containing the fix implemented in commit 96bbd7f.
  • Restrict network access to port 7624 using host-based firewalls or network ACLs to ensure only authorized control machines can reach the service.
  • Deploy network intrusion detection signatures to identify TCP packets directed at port 7624 containing unusually large XML tag identifiers.
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