<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Emiago - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/emiago/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 01:58:47 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/emiago/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>Denial of Service via Unvalidated WebSocket Frame Length in sipgo</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-sipgo-dos/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 01:58:47 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-sipgo-dos/</guid><description>An unauthenticated denial of service vulnerability in the sipgo WebSocket transport allows attackers to crash the service by sending a crafted frame with an oversized payload length field.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Go-based SIP library <code>sipgo</code> (versions &lt;= 1.4.2) contains a critical vulnerability in its WebSocket transport implementation, tracked as CVE-2026-77322. The <code>WSConnection.Read</code> function allocates a memory buffer based on the length field provided within a client-controlled WebSocket frame header without performing bounds validation.</p>
<p>When <code>NextFrame()</code> is called, it initializes a <code>wsutil.NewReader</code> without enforcing a <code>MaxFrameSize</code> limit. An attacker can initiate a standard WebSocket handshake and subsequently transmit a single masked text frame with a payload length declared as an extremely high value (e.g., 2^63-1). This triggers a runtime panic due to an attempt to allocate an out-of-range slice, leading to an immediate crash of the entire server process. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous as it is unauthenticated, trivial to exploit, and requires only a single network packet to disrupt service availability.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Attacker establishes a WebSocket connection to the target server utilizing the <code>sipgo</code> library.</li>
<li>Attacker performs the standard WebSocket handshake process to establish the transport session.</li>
<li>Attacker constructs a malicious masked WebSocket text frame.</li>
<li>Attacker sets the frame header length marker to <code>127</code> to indicate an 8-byte length field.</li>
<li>Attacker sets the length value in the frame header to <code>0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</code> (2^63-1).</li>
<li>Server process calls <code>WSConnection.Read</code> and proceeds to allocate a slice based on the malicious header length.</li>
<li>Runtime environment throws a <code>makeslice: len out of range</code> panic, resulting in an unhandled crash of the server process.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation results in an immediate, unauthenticated denial of service by crashing the host application. Services utilizing <code>sipgo</code> for SIP over WebSocket/WSS are susceptible to process termination, which can cause significant service disruption for telephony and communication infrastructure.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<p>Prioritized, concrete actions:</p>
<ul>
<li>Update the <code>sipgo</code> library to a version containing the fix for CVE-2026-77322, which enforces <code>MaxFrameSize</code> within <code>wsutil.NewReader</code>.</li>
<li>Implement upstream network filtering or WAF policies to drop WebSocket traffic containing header-declared payload lengths exceeding the maximum expected message size for your specific SIP application.</li>
<li>For detection, monitor server logs for recurring application panics or process restarts shortly following a WebSocket handshake, which may indicate active exploitation attempts.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">medium</category><category domain="type">threat</category><category>denial-of-service</category><category>vulnerability</category><category>sipgo</category><category>go</category></item></channel></rss>