Elixir-Protobuf - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/elixir-protobuf/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 15 Jul 2026 17:45:25 +0000Unbounded Recursion Depth in Elixir Protobuf Decoder Causes Denial of Servicehttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-protobuf-unbounded-recursion-dos/Wed, 15 Jul 2026 17:45:25 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-protobuf-unbounded-recursion-dos/An unauthenticated attacker can trigger a denial-of-service condition in services that decode untrusted protobuf messages using the `Protobuf.Decoder` (Hex package `protobuf`) versions between 0.8.0 and 0.16.1 by crafting deeply nested self-referential message types, leading to memory exhaustion and service crashes.CVE-2026-54451 describes a high-severity vulnerability involving unbounded recursion depth in the Protobuf.Decoder component of the Elixir protobuf Hex package, affecting versions >= 0.8.0 and < 0.16.1. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to launch a denial-of-service attack against any Elixir service that decodes untrusted Protobuf messages, particularly those with self-referential or cyclic message types in their schema. By sending a small, specially crafted Protobuf message (a few KB to MB) containing deeply nested fields, the attacker forces the BEAM runtime to recurse millions of times without a depth limit. This leads to severe memory exhaustion, excessive CPU consumption, and scheduler pinning, effectively rendering the victim service unresponsive or causing it to crash. The lack of a recursion-depth counter, unlike reference Protobuf implementations, makes the protobuf library vulnerable to request-amplification DoS attacks.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker identifies an Elixir service that utilizes the vulnerable protobuf Hex package (versions between 0.8.0 and 0.16.1) to decode untrusted Protobuf input.
  2. The attacker determines or defines a self-referential Protobuf message schema (e.g., message Tree { Tree child = 1; }) that the target application is configured to decode.
  3. The attacker crafts a malicious Protobuf message in wire format, recursively nesting the self-referential field hundreds of thousands to millions of times.
  4. The crafted message is optimized to be small in overall size (e.g., a few KB to a few MB) to maximize recursion depth while minimizing bandwidth consumption for the attacker.
  5. The attacker sends the malicious message via an HTTP POST request with Content-Type: application/x-protobuf to an endpoint that processes and calls Tree.decode/1 on the input.
  6. The vulnerable Protobuf.Decoder.value_for_field/3 function is invoked and recursively calls decode for each nested level without enforcing any depth limit.
  7. Each recursive call consumes a new stack frame and allocates heap memory, leading to rapid exhaustion of process memory and significant CPU load on the BEAM runtime.
  8. The victim service experiences a denial of service, becoming unresponsive or crashing, particularly if multiple concurrent requests are processed.

Impact

This vulnerability (CVE-2026-54451) allows an unauthenticated, network-reachable attacker to perform a request-amplification denial-of-service against any Elixir service that decodes untrusted Protobuf messages containing self-referential or cyclic types. A single small, maliciously crafted request can consume seconds of CPU time and hundreds of megabytes of memory on the victim server. Just a few concurrent requests can lead to complete service unavailability or node crashes, severely impacting the reliability and accessibility of affected applications.

Recommendation

  • Patch CVE-2026-54451 immediately by updating the protobuf Hex package to version 0.16.1 or higher to ensure the recursion depth limit is enforced.
  • Review webserver access logs and HTTP proxy logs for POST requests containing Content-Type: application/x-protobuf with unusually large Content-Length headers, which may indicate attempted exploitation.
  • Implement robust application-level logging to capture Protobuf.DecodeError exceptions, as these indicate attempts to trigger or successful exploitation of recursion limits.
  • Monitor Elixir BEAM node resources, specifically CPU utilization, memory consumption, and process stack depth, for sudden spikes or sustained high usage that could indicate a denial-of-service attack.
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