<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Electrum - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/electrum/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 15:50:58 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/electrum/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>Electrum: Unverified signature vulnerability in mempool transactions (CVE-2026-117601)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-electrum-sig-verification/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 15:50:58 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-electrum-sig-verification/</guid><description>Electrum versions prior to 4.8.3 fail to verify signatures of wallet-owned inputs in unconfirmed transactions, allowing malicious servers to trick users into signing fraudulent fee-replacement transactions.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Electrum versions before 4.8.3 contain a vulnerability (CVE-2026-117601) where the client fails to verify the signatures of wallet-owned inputs for transactions residing in the unconfirmed mempool. This flaw allows a malicious server to intercept and replace a broadcast transaction with a conflicting one.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Attackers can manipulate the user's view of pending transactions, suppressing the original broadcast and presenting a modified, invalid zero-fee version that pays an attacker-controlled address. By presenting this as a transaction that requires an RBF (Replace-By-Fee) bump, the attacker tricks the user into signing a transaction that transfers funds to the attacker.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade Electrum clients to version 4.8.3 or later on all systems where the wallet software is installed.</li>
<li>Until patching is complete, verify all RBF requests against the intended recipient address and fee structure before signing transactions.</li>
<li>For enterprise or high-value environments, isolate Electrum instances to connect only to trusted, verified Electrum servers rather than relying on auto-discovered or public nodes.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category></item></channel></rss>