https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/digitalocean/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 03 Jan 2024 14:30:00 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-multi-cloud-cli-token-harvesting/Wed, 03 Jan 2024 14:30:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-multi-cloud-cli-token-harvesting/This rule detects command-line activity indicative of credential access across multiple cloud platforms (GCP, Azure, AWS, GitHub, DigitalOcean, Oracle, Kubernetes), looking for specific commands used to print or access tokens and credentials, flagging hosts where multiple cloud targets are accessed within a five-minute window, suggesting potential credential harvesting activity.This threat brief focuses on detecting command-line credential harvesting across multiple cloud platforms. Attackers may attempt to steal application access tokens or extract credentials from files by executing specific commands via command-line interfaces (CLIs) for GCP, Azure, AWS, GitHub, DigitalOcean, Oracle, and Kubernetes. This activity is particularly concerning when originating from the same host within a short time frame (e.g., five minutes), potentially indicating automated credential theft. This technique can lead to unauthorized access to cloud resources, data breaches, and lateral movement within cloud environments. Defenders should monitor for suspicious command-line activity involving cloud CLIs and credential access patterns.

Attack Chain

1. An attacker gains initial access to a system, possibly via compromised credentials or exploiting a vulnerability.
2. The attacker uses a shell (cmd.exe, PowerShell, bash, etc.) to execute cloud CLI commands.
3. The attacker executes commands to list available credentials or tokens (e.g., aws configure list, az account list, kubectl config view).
4. The attacker executes commands to print access tokens for various cloud providers (e.g., gcloud auth print-access-token, az account get-access-token, gh auth token).
5. The attacker uses credential harvesting commands across multiple cloud platforms within a short timeframe.
6. The attacker exfiltrates the harvested credentials to a remote location.
7. The attacker uses the stolen credentials to access sensitive cloud resources and data.
8. The attacker performs lateral movement within the cloud environment.

Impact

A successful attack can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive cloud resources, data breaches, and lateral movement within cloud environments. The impact includes potential data exfiltration, service disruption, and financial loss. The number of affected victims will depend on the scope of the compromised credentials and the attacker’s ability to exploit them.

Recommendation

• Deploy the Sigma rule “Multi-Cloud CLI Token and Credential Access Commands” to your SIEM to detect suspicious command-line activity related to cloud credential harvesting.
• Review Esql.process_command_line_values in the rule output to identify the exact commands executed and determine if the activity was legitimate or malicious.
• Correlate the detected activity with authentication, Kubernetes audit, and cloud API logs to confirm unauthorized access and misuse of printed tokens.
• Implement monitoring and alerting for unusual CLI activity originating from user workstations or build servers, focusing on the CLIs mentioned in the Overview section.
• Follow vendor-specific guidance to revoke compromised credentials, such as revoking tokens and rotating secrets, as outlined in the rule’s “Response and remediation” section.

]]>highadvisorycredential-accesscloudclitoken-harvestinghttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-02-livewire-markdown-editor-upload/Tue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-02-livewire-markdown-editor-upload/The livewire-markdown-editor versions before v1.3 contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the MarkdownEditor::updatedAttachments() Livewire handler, allowing authenticated users to upload any file type, potentially leading to stored XSS, phishing, malware distribution, and markdown injection.Versions of mckenziearts/livewire-markdown-editor prior to v1.3 are vulnerable to arbitrary file upload via the MarkdownEditor::updatedAttachments() Livewire handler. This handler lacks server-side validation for file types, extensions, and content. An authenticated user with access to a page embedding the markdown editor can upload malicious files (e.g., .html, .svg, .js) to the disk configured by livewire-markdown-editor.disk. If this disk is a public cloud storage bucket (S3, DigitalOcean Spaces, Cloudflare R2, Scaleway Object Storage), the uploaded files are publicly accessible with a guessed Content-Type header. This vulnerability allows attackers to perform stored XSS, host phishing pages, distribute malware, and inject malicious markdown. A real-world exploitation was observed in production.

Attack Chain

1. An attacker gains access to an application using a vulnerable version of mckenziearts/livewire-markdown-editor.
2. The attacker navigates to a page embedding the <livewire:markdown-editor> component.
3. The attacker uses the file upload functionality of the editor to upload a malicious file, such as a .html or .svg file containing XSS payloads.
4. The MarkdownEditor::updatedAttachments() Livewire handler processes the uploaded file without proper validation.
5. The handler stores the file on the disk configured by livewire-markdown-editor.disk (e.g., a public cloud bucket like S3, DigitalOcean Spaces, Cloudflare R2, Scaleway Object Storage).
6. The uploaded file becomes publicly accessible on the storage domain.
7. A user visits the URL of the uploaded malicious file, triggering the XSS payload or accessing the phishing page.
8. The attacker achieves their objective, such as stealing user credentials, redirecting users to malicious websites, or compromising the application’s integrity.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to several critical impacts. Stored XSS on the storage domain can allow attackers to steal user credentials or perform other malicious actions in the context of the application. Phishing pages hosted on the application’s storage domain can trick users into revealing sensitive information. Malware distribution from a domain users trust can lead to widespread infections. Additionally, markdown injection via crafted filenames can compromise the integrity of the editor’s output. A real-world exploitation of this vulnerability was observed in production on a community platform using this package.

Recommendation

• Upgrade to mckenziearts/livewire-markdown-editor v1.3 or later to patch the vulnerability.
• If immediate upgrading is not feasible, disable the upload UI on every instance of the editor by passing :show-upload="false". This prevents the vulnerable code path from being reached.
• Monitor web server logs (category webserver, product linux) for requests to the storage domain for unusual file extensions like .html, .svg, .js, .php, or .exe, which could indicate attempted exploitation.
• Implement the file upload detection rule to identify potentially malicious file uploads to the storage domain.

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