{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/connectwise/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":8.4,"id":"CVE-2024-1708"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["ScreenConnect"],"_cs_severities":["critical"],"_cs_tags":["path-traversal","remote-code-execution","cve-2024-1708","connectwise"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["ConnectWise"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eCVE-2024-1708 is a critical path traversal vulnerability affecting ConnectWise ScreenConnect. This flaw could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute remote code or directly access confidential data and critical systems. ConnectWise released security bulletin 23.9.8 to address this vulnerability. Given the potential for remote code execution and data compromise, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to organizations using ConnectWise ScreenConnect, potentially allowing full system takeover. CISA added this to their KEV catalog and recommends applying mitigations per vendor instructions, following BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinuing use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn unauthenticated attacker identifies a ConnectWise ScreenConnect server exposed to the internet.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker crafts a malicious HTTP request containing a path traversal payload targeting a vulnerable endpoint within ScreenConnect. This payload is designed to bypass authentication checks.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe ScreenConnect server processes the malicious request, and the path traversal vulnerability allows the attacker to access files outside of the intended webroot directory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages the file access to read sensitive configuration files, potentially containing credentials or other sensitive information.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAlternatively, the attacker uploads a malicious executable (e.g., a web shell) to a writeable directory accessible via path traversal.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker executes the uploaded web shell, gaining remote code execution on the ScreenConnect server.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the compromised ScreenConnect server as a pivot point to move laterally within the internal network, escalating privileges and compromising additional systems.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker exfiltrates sensitive data or deploys ransomware, disrupting business operations and causing significant financial damage.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 can lead to complete compromise of ConnectWise ScreenConnect servers and potentially the entire network. Attackers could exfiltrate sensitive data, deploy ransomware, or use the compromised systems for lateral movement. Given the widespread use of ScreenConnect in MSP environments, a successful attack could impact numerous downstream clients, causing widespread disruption.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eApply the mitigations provided by ConnectWise in security bulletin 23.9.8 to patch CVE-2024-1708.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Detect Suspicious ScreenConnect Path Traversal Attempts\u0026rdquo; to identify potential exploitation attempts in web server logs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor network traffic for suspicious outbound connections originating from ScreenConnect servers, as this could indicate post-exploitation activity.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and harden the configuration of ConnectWise ScreenConnect servers, following security best practices to minimize the attack surface.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-04-29T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-04-29T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-04-29-screenconnect-path-traversal/","summary":"CVE-2024-1708 is a path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect that could allow an attacker to execute remote code or directly impact confidential data and critical systems.","title":"ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Vulnerability (CVE-2024-1708)","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-04-29-screenconnect-path-traversal/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Elastic Endpoint","Sysmon"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["command-and-control","remote-access","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["TeamViewer","LogMeIn","AnyDesk","ScreenConnect","ConnectWise","Splashtop","Zoho","RustDesk","n-able","Kaseya","BeyondTrust","Tailscale","JumpCloud","VNC","Datto","Auvik","SyncroMSP","Pulseway","NinjaOne","Liongard","Naverisk","Panorama9","Tactical RMM","MeshCentral","ISL Online","Goverlan","Iperius","Remotix","Mikogo","Action1","Elastic"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection identifies DNS queries to commonly abused remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote access software domains originating from processes that are not web browsers. This activity can indicate the use of legitimate RMM tools for malicious purposes, such as command and control, persistence, or lateral movement within a network. The detection aims to surface RMM clients, scripts, or other non-browser activities contacting these services without legitimate user interaction. Defenders should investigate processes making these queries to confirm expected behavior and validate the security posture of their managed assets. The rule is based on a list of known RMM domains and excludes common browser processes to reduce false positives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to a Windows host through unspecified means.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker deploys or leverages an existing RMM tool on the compromised host.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe RMM tool, running as a non-browser process, initiates a DNS query to resolve a command and control server associated with the RMM service (e.g., teamviewer.com).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe DNS query is made by a process other than a known web browser (chrome.exe, firefox.exe, etc.).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe compromised host establishes a connection to the resolved IP address associated with the RMM domain.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the RMM tool to execute commands, transfer files, or perform other malicious activities on the compromised host.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker may use the RMM tool for lateral movement, pivoting to other systems within the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves their objective, which could include data exfiltration, ransomware deployment, or maintaining persistent access.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCompromise via abused RMM software can lead to full system compromise, data theft, or deployment of ransomware. While the number of affected victims is unknown, the sectors most likely to be impacted include any organization that relies on RMM tools for IT management. Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass traditional security controls by using legitimate software, making detection more challenging.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;DNS Queries to Known RMM Domains from Non-Browser Processes\u0026rdquo; to your SIEM and tune the RMM domain list for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule, focusing on identifying the process responsible for the DNS query and its parent process.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement application control policies to restrict the execution of unauthorized RMM tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon DNS event logging to ensure the necessary data is available for the detection rule.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCorrelate with other alerts to identify potential compromises.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview process.code_signature for trusted RMM publishers and investigate any unsigned or unexpected signers.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-rmm-dns-non-browser/","summary":"Detection of DNS queries to remote monitoring and management (RMM) domains from non-browser processes indicating potential misuse of legitimate remote access tools for command and control.","title":"Suspicious DNS Queries to RMM Domains from Non-Browser Processes","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-rmm-dns-non-browser/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — ConnectWise","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}