AsyncHttpClient — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/asynchttpclient/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioMon, 18 May 2026 16:44:58 +0000async-http-client Cookie Header Leak on Cross-Origin Redirecthttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-async-http-cookie-leak/Mon, 18 May 2026 16:44:58 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-async-http-cookie-leak/The async-http-client library leaks `Cookie` headers to cross-origin redirect targets due to missing header stripping in `Redirect30xInterceptor.java`, potentially exposing sensitive information to malicious third parties.The async-http-client library is vulnerable to leaking Cookie headers to cross-origin redirect targets. Specifically, when following a redirect across a security boundary (different origin, or HTTPS→HTTP downgrade), the propagatedHeaders() method in Redirect30xInterceptor.java does not strip the Cookie header, leading to potential exposure of session cookies, CSRF tokens, and API keys. This vulnerability exists in versions of async-http-client between 3.0.0.Beta1 and 3.0.10, as well as between 2.0.0 and 2.15.0. Attackers can exploit this by crafting malicious redirects that forward sensitive cookie data to attacker-controlled destinations, potentially leading to session hijacking and data theft. This matters for defenders as it exposes applications using the affected library to significant security risks if they rely on redirects with cookies for authentication or authorization. The vulnerability is fixed in versions 3.0.10 and 2.15.0. CVE-2026-45300 has been assigned to this issue.

Attack Chain

  1. The victim’s application initiates an HTTP request to a trusted API endpoint.
  2. The trusted API endpoint responds with a 302 redirect to a malicious URL (e.g., https://evil.com).
  3. The Redirect30xInterceptor.java class in async-http-client processes the redirect.
  4. The propagatedHeaders() method is called to determine which headers to forward.
  5. Due to the vulnerability, the Cookie header is not stripped, unlike Authorization and Proxy-Authorization.
  6. The async-http-client library forwards the original request, including the Cookie header, to the malicious URL.
  7. The attacker-controlled server at evil.com receives the leaked Cookie header.
  8. The attacker can then extract sensitive information from the Cookie header, such as session IDs, CSRF tokens, or API keys for malicious purposes.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to:

  • Session hijacking: Attackers can use leaked session cookies to impersonate legitimate users.
  • CSRF token theft: Attackers can steal CSRF tokens carried in cookies to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.
  • API key theft: Attackers can obtain API keys stored in cookies to access sensitive resources.
  • Privacy breaches: Tracking identifiers leak to third-party origins, compromising user privacy.

Attack scenarios include open-redirects in trusted API endpoints, compromised CDNs or API gateways injecting redirects, and man-in-the-middle attacks on plaintext hops in the redirect chain. Organizations using vulnerable versions of async-http-client are at risk.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade async-http-client to version 3.0.10 or 2.15.0 to patch the vulnerability as described in the fix details.
  • Deploy the Sigma rule “Detect AsyncHttpClient Cookie Leak via Redirect” to identify potential exploitation attempts in web server logs.
  • Review and audit application code to ensure proper handling of redirects and cookie security.
  • Monitor network traffic for suspicious redirects to external domains and unexpected cookie transfers.
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