Ardatan - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/ardatan/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioMon, 26 Oct 2026 16:13:58 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.pngCraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/3232https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg@graphql-tools/utils: Prototype pollution in mergeIncrementalResulthttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-graphql-tools-prototype-pollution-9385e300/Mon, 26 Oct 2026 16:13:58 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-graphql-tools-prototype-pollution-9385e300/A prototype pollution vulnerability in @graphql-tools/utils allows an attacker to inject arbitrary properties into Object.prototype via unvalidated path segments in incremental GraphQL responses.The @graphql-tools/utils package (versions 10.10.1 through 12.0.1) contains a prototype pollution vulnerability in the mergeIncrementalResult function. The function incorrectly validates path segments by using strict equality checks (===) against forbidden keys like '__proto__', 'constructor', and 'prototype'. Because the function does not verify that these path segments are primitive types (strings or numbers), an attacker can supply an object, such as an array ["__proto__"]. In JavaScript, this is coerced into the string "__proto__" during property access, successfully bypassing the protection check and allowing the attacker to write values onto Object.prototype. This can lead to authorization bypass, configuration manipulation, or unexpected application behavior in any consuming Node.js process.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker gains control over, or performs a MITM attack on, an upstream GraphQL subgraph or transport layer.
  2. The attacker crafts a malicious incremental GraphQL response (such as an @defer or @stream patch).
  3. The attacker sets the path field in the response to include a non-primitive, array-based segment: [["__proto__"], "maliciousKey"].
  4. The consuming application receives the malicious response and passes it to the public mergeIncrementalResult helper.
  5. mergeIncrementalResult calls setObjectKeyPath, which checks the array ["__proto__"] against the forbidden strings; the check fails (returning false) because the types do not match, allowing the segment to proceed.
  6. During assignment, current[key] triggers ToPropertyKey coercion, converting the array to the string "__proto__".
  7. The function resolves Object.prototype and assigns the attacker's value to the chosen key.
  8. Unrelated objects created subsequently in the Node.js process inherit the polluted property, altering application logic.

Impact

An attacker can overwrite properties on Object.prototype, potentially impacting global application security controls (e.g., overriding isAdmin flags or configuration objects). This effect persists for the lifetime of the Node.js process and applies to all objects instantiated after the pollution event, escaping the scope of the original GraphQL response.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade @graphql-tools/utils to a patched version once available, or implement a wrapper to validate that all path segments are strictly primitive strings or numbers before calling mergeIncrementalResult.
  • Use Object.freeze(Object.prototype) in the consuming Node.js application to mitigate the impact of prototype pollution attempts.
  • Implement runtime input validation on all upstream data sources that provide incremental GraphQL responses.
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