<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Anthropic — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/anthropic/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/vendors/anthropic/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Claude Code Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-claude-code-trust-bypass/</link><pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-claude-code-trust-bypass/</guid><description>A vulnerability in Claude Code allowed for trust dialog bypass via git worktree spoofing, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution by crafting a malicious repository with a `commondir` file pointing to a previously trusted path, bypassing the trust dialog, and executing malicious hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A vulnerability in Claude Code, specifically versions 2.1.63 and later but before 2.1.84, allowed for a trust dialog bypass via Git worktree spoofing. This exploit leverages the way Claude Code determines folder trust using the <code>commondir</code> file in Git worktrees. By crafting a repository containing a <code>commondir</code> file that points to a path the victim has previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog, leading to arbitrary code execution through malicious hooks defined in the <code>.claude/settings.json</code> file. Successful exploitation required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, as well as the attacker knowing or guessing a path the victim had previously trusted. Users on standard Claude Code with auto-update enabled received the fix automatically.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Attacker crafts a malicious Git repository with a <code>commondir</code> file.</li>
<li>The <code>commondir</code> file is configured to point to a directory path the victim is likely to have previously trusted.</li>
<li>The repository includes a malicious <code>.claude/settings.json</code> file containing arbitrary code execution hooks.</li>
<li>Attacker distributes the malicious repository, likely through social engineering or other deceptive means.</li>
<li>Victim clones the malicious repository to their local machine using <code>git clone</code>.</li>
<li>Victim opens the cloned directory containing the malicious <code>.claude/settings.json</code> in a vulnerable version of Claude Code.</li>
<li>Claude Code reads the <code>commondir</code> file and incorrectly trusts the repository based on the spoofed path.</li>
<li>The malicious hooks defined in <code>.claude/settings.json</code> are executed, leading to arbitrary code execution on the victim&rsquo;s machine.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allowed an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a victim&rsquo;s machine. While the number of affected users is unknown, the impact of successful exploitation could range from data theft and system compromise to complete takeover of the victim&rsquo;s development environment. The vulnerability primarily targeted developers using Claude Code, potentially impacting software development organizations.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade Claude Code to the latest version (&gt;= 2.1.84) to patch CVE-2026-40068.</li>
<li>Implement a detection rule that identifies the creation or modification of <code>.claude/settings.json</code> files containing suspicious code (see Sigma rule below).</li>
<li>Monitor process creation events for unusual processes being launched from within the Claude Code application context (see Sigma rule below).</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>git</category><category>code-execution</category><category>trust-bypass</category></item></channel></rss>