Attack Chain

1. An attacker crafts and submits a malicious Velocity template containing an RCE payload to a vulnerable application.
2. The vulnerable velocityjs template engine begins processing the malicious template, specifically evaluating the expression $x.constructor.constructor(...).
3. During template evaluation, the getAttributes() function in references.cjs is called for $x.constructor, which, due to a lack of filtering, resolves to the Object constructor.
4. Subsequently, the second .constructor lookup on the Object constructor is processed, also via getAttributes(), resolving to the JavaScript Function constructor.
5. The attacker's arbitrary JavaScript string payload, such as "return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('whoami').toString()" from the PoC, is passed as an argument to the Function constructor.
6. This action dynamically creates a new JavaScript function object containing the attacker's supplied code, which includes a call to child_process.execSync for command execution.
7. The newly created malicious function is then assigned to a Velocity template variable (e.g., $f) using the #set directive.
8. The Velocity template subsequently invokes this variable ($f()), triggering the execution of the embedded system command (whoami in the PoC) on the underlying operating system and allowing the attacker to receive its output.

Impact

Applications using velocityjs versions <= 2.1.6 are at severe risk of full server compromise. A successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the vulnerable application, potentially leading to the theft of sensitive data, access to cloud credentials, and the ability to pivot to other systems within the internal network. The vulnerability's nature as an RCE means direct control over the host system, making it a critical threat to any organization deploying affected velocityjs applications. The previous fix for prototype pollution (GHSA-j658-c2gf-x6pq) was bypassed, making this a more severe RCE rather than just data manipulation.

Recommendation

• Upgrade all instances of velocityjs to version 2.1.7 or later immediately to apply the patch mentioned in the references.
• Deploy the provided Sigma rule to detect suspicious process creation patterns indicative of RCE attempts originating from Node.js applications.
• Enable comprehensive process_creation logging for all Node.js application servers to capture details such as parent process, image path, and command line arguments.
• Block the malicious Velocity template syntax identified in the IOCs at application input layers if immediate patching is not feasible.