<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Utcp-Cli — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/utcp-cli/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 20:56:40 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/utcp-cli/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>utcp-cli Command Injection Vulnerability via Unsanitized Argument Substitution (CVE-2026-45369)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-utcp-cli-command-injection/</link><pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 20:56:40 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-utcp-cli-command-injection/</guid><description>The `utcp-cli` package is vulnerable to command injection. The `_substitute_utcp_args` method in `cli_communication_protocol.py` inserts user-controlled values directly into shell command strings without sanitization, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands, resulting in full Remote Code Execution. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.1.2.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <code>utcp-cli</code> package before version 1.1.2 contains a command injection vulnerability within the <code>_substitute_utcp_args</code> method of <code>cli_communication_protocol.py</code>. This flaw stems from the direct insertion of user-controlled <code>tool_args</code> values into shell command strings without proper sanitization or escaping. Subsequently, these crafted commands are executed using <code>/bin/bash -c</code> on Unix-like systems or <code>powershell.exe -Command</code> on Windows, enabling a malicious actor to inject arbitrary shell commands. This vulnerability poses a significant risk, as it allows for complete Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the affected host. The issue has been addressed in <code>utcp-cli</code> version 1.1.2 by implementing shell-quoting of all substituted values using <code>shlex.quote</code> on Unix and PowerShell single-quoted literals on Windows systems, which mitigates the risk of metacharacter injection. The vulnerability was reported by @ZeroXJacks.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>An attacker crafts a malicious payload containing shell metacharacters.</li>
<li>The attacker supplies this payload as a value within the <code>tool_args</code> dictionary.</li>
<li>The vulnerable <code>_substitute_utcp_args</code> method substitutes the attacker-controlled value into a command string.</li>
<li>Due to the lack of sanitization, the command string now contains the injected shell metacharacters.</li>
<li>The command string is embedded within a shell script.</li>
<li>The shell script is executed using <code>/bin/bash -c</code> or <code>powershell.exe -Command</code>.</li>
<li>The injected shell metacharacters are interpreted, executing arbitrary commands.</li>
<li>The attacker achieves Remote Code Execution on the host system.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the host system with the privileges of the <code>utcp-cli</code> application. This can lead to complete system compromise, including data exfiltration, malware installation, and denial-of-service. Given the severity and ease of exploitation, any system running a vulnerable version of <code>utcp-cli</code> is at critical risk.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade <code>utcp-cli</code> to version 1.1.2 or later to remediate CVE-2026-45369.</li>
<li>Deploy the Sigma rule &ldquo;Detect utcp-cli Command Injection Attempt via Argument Substitution&rdquo; to your SIEM and tune for your environment.</li>
<li>If upgrading is not immediately feasible, restrict or audit user-supplied input to <code>tool_args</code> to mitigate the risk of command injection.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">critical</category><category domain="type">threat</category><category>command-injection</category><category>rce</category><category>utcp-cli</category></item></channel></rss>