<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>T1490 — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/t1490/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/t1490/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Windows System Restore Disabled via Registry Modification</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-03-disable-system-restore/</link><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-03-disable-system-restore/</guid><description>Attackers disable Windows System Restore by modifying specific registry keys to hinder recovery efforts after malicious activity.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Attackers may disable the Windows System Restore feature to prevent victims from easily reverting their systems to a clean state after an infection or other malicious activity. This action complicates incident response and remediation efforts, forcing more complex and time-consuming recovery procedures. Disabling system restore is often performed post-compromise to ensure persistence and hinder forensic analysis. This technique can be implemented manually through the registry editor or via automated scripts, making it accessible to a wide range of threat actors.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Initial access is gained through various methods (e.g., phishing, exploitation).</li>
<li>The attacker escalates privileges to Administrator or SYSTEM.</li>
<li>The attacker uses <code>reg.exe</code> or PowerShell to modify registry keys.</li>
<li>The attacker targets the <code>HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore\DisableConfig</code> registry key.</li>
<li>Alternatively, the attacker targets the <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore\DisableSR</code> registry key.</li>
<li>The attacker sets the value of the targeted registry key to <code>DWORD:00000001</code>.</li>
<li>The attacker confirms the System Restore feature is disabled.</li>
<li>The attacker proceeds with further malicious activities, knowing that recovery is hindered.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Disabling System Restore can significantly impede recovery efforts following a cyber incident. Organizations may face longer downtimes and increased costs associated with manual system reimaging or advanced forensic analysis. The absence of readily available restore points can also lead to data loss if systems are severely damaged or encrypted.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Deploy the Sigma rule <code>Registry Disable System Restore</code> to your SIEM to detect malicious attempts to disable System Restore via registry modification.</li>
<li>Monitor registry modifications related to System Restore configurations, focusing on the keys <code>\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore</code> and <code>\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore</code>, and values set to <code>DWORD (0x00000001)</code>.</li>
<li>Implement strict access controls to prevent unauthorized modification of registry settings.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">medium</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>impact</category><category>t1490</category><category>persistence</category></item></channel></rss>