<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Session-Management — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/session-management/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 14:05:41 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/session-management/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Open WebUI CORS Misconfiguration and Session Validation Vulnerability Leads to RCE</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-open-webui-cors-rce/</link><pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 14:05:41 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-open-webui-cors-rce/</guid><description>Open WebUI version v0.3.10 has a CORS misconfiguration and session validation issue that can lead to remote code execution due to a one-click attack against admin users.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A critical vulnerability exists in Open WebUI version v0.3.10 due to a combination of CORS misconfiguration (GHSL-2024-174) and session management flaws (GHSL-2024-175). The CORS misconfiguration on multiple API endpoints allows arbitrary websites to make authenticated cross-site requests to Open WebUI. When combined with the failure to invalidate session cookies upon logout, this allows an attacker to perform a one-click attack, potentially gaining remote code execution on the Open WebUI instance.  The application, by default, runs as root within a Docker container, escalating the impact to a full container compromise.  This vulnerability affects users who have admin access to the <code>/api/v1/functions</code> endpoint, allowing execution of arbitrary code.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>An attacker crafts a malicious website (<code>attacker.com</code>) containing JavaScript code that exploits the CORS misconfiguration.</li>
<li>The attacker lures an Open WebUI administrator to visit the malicious website.</li>
<li>The JavaScript on the attacker&rsquo;s website bypasses CORS restrictions due to the <code>allow_origins=[&quot;*&quot;]</code> configuration.</li>
<li>The malicious script sends an authenticated POST request to the <code>/api/v1/functions/create</code> endpoint, creating a malicious filter. This step requires the user to have an active Open WebUI session.</li>
<li>The attacker&rsquo;s script then sends another POST request to <code>/api/v1/functions/id/{filter_id}/toggle</code> to activate the newly created filter, executing arbitrary code.</li>
<li>The code injected by the filter executes a command (e.g., <code>whoami</code>) and writes the output to a file (<code>/tmp/whoami.txt</code>) on the Open WebUI server.</li>
<li>Because Open WebUI reuses session cookies after logout, the attacker can potentially regain access even if the admin has logged out, provided the browser hasn&rsquo;t been closed.</li>
<li>The attacker achieves remote code execution on the Open WebUI server, with the potential to fully compromise the Docker container due to the default root user context.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the Open WebUI server. Given the default configuration where Open WebUI runs as root within a Docker container, this can lead to a complete compromise of the container and potentially the host system. The vulnerability affects any Open WebUI instance with an administrator who visits the malicious website, making it a widespread risk. The lack of session invalidation post-logout increases the window of opportunity for attackers, even if the admin user is no longer actively using the application.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Modify the Open WebUI CORS configuration to remove the permissive <code>allow_origins=[&quot;*&quot;]</code> and implement a more restrictive policy. Allow dynamic setup of allowed origins via the administration panel or a configuration file, as described in the remediation guidance for GHSL-2024-174.</li>
<li>Implement proper session invalidation upon logout. Ensure new cookies are generated for every session, and invalidate/remove previous session cookies from the browser&rsquo;s storage upon logout, as described in the remediation guidance for GHSL-2024-175.</li>
<li>Deploy the Sigma rule &ldquo;Detect Open WebUI Function Creation via API&rdquo; to identify potential exploitation attempts targeting the <code>/api/v1/functions/create</code> endpoint.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>cors</category><category>rce</category><category>session-management</category><category>open-webui</category></item></channel></rss>