{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/script_execution/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Sysmon"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["windows","wmi","script_execution","initial_access","execution"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection identifies the use of Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) to execute processes via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). Adversaries exploit WMI to execute scripts or processes stealthily, often using script interpreters. The rule monitors for these interpreters executing processes via WMI, specifically when initiated by non-system accounts, indicating potential malicious intent. The detection focuses on identifying scenarios where \u003ccode\u003ewmiutils.dll\u003c/code\u003e is loaded by \u003ccode\u003ewscript.exe\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ecscript.exe\u003c/code\u003e, followed by \u003ccode\u003ewmiprvse.exe\u003c/code\u003e spawning a new process. This is often associated with malicious initial access or execution techniques.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access via phishing (T1566) or other means.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages a script, such as VBScript or JavaScript (T1059.005, T1059.007), to execute commands using WMI.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe script interpreter (\u003ccode\u003ecscript.exe\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ewscript.exe\u003c/code\u003e) loads \u003ccode\u003ewmiutils.dll\u003c/code\u003e to interact with WMI.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe WMI Provider Host process (\u003ccode\u003ewmiprvse.exe\u003c/code\u003e) is invoked as a parent process, triggered by the script execution.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003ewmiprvse.exe\u003c/code\u003e executes a secondary process, such as \u003ccode\u003epowershell.exe\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e, or other executables, often from unusual locations like \u003ccode\u003eC:\\\\Users\\\\\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eC:\\\\ProgramData\\\\\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe executed process performs malicious actions, such as downloading additional payloads or establishing persistence.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker attempts to maintain persistence by creating scheduled tasks or modifying registry keys.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe ultimate objective is often lateral movement, data exfiltration, or deploying ransomware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary code, bypass security controls, and establish persistence on the compromised system. The use of WMI enables stealthy execution, making detection challenging. The impact can range from data theft and system compromise to full network takeover. In some cases, threat actors may deploy ransomware, leading to significant financial losses and operational disruption.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) and Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) logging to provide the necessary data for the provided Sigma rules.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the provided Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;WMI Scripting Process Creation\u0026rdquo; to detect suspicious process creation events originating from \u003ccode\u003ewmiprvse.exe\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the provided Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;WMI Scripting Process Creation\u0026rdquo; with a focus on processes spawned by wmiprvse.exe from unusual locations or with suspicious command-line arguments.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement endpoint protection policies to block or alert on the execution of high-risk processes when initiated by non-system accounts as mentioned in the overview.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRegularly review and update endpoint protection policies to block or alert on the execution of high-risk processes like those listed in the detection query, especially when initiated by non-system accounts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-wmi-script-execution/","summary":"The rule identifies the use of Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) executing a process via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), which may indicate malicious activity, especially when initiated by non-system accounts.","title":"Windows Script Interpreter Executing Process via WMI","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-wmi-script-execution/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Script_execution","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}