Attack Chain

1. An attacker gains initial access to an AWS account, potentially through compromised credentials or by exploiting a vulnerability in an application running within the environment.
2. The attacker enumerates existing EC2 route tables to identify potential targets for manipulation using ec2:DescribeRouteTables.
3. The attacker uses ec2:ReplaceRoute to modify a route within a route table, redirecting traffic destined for a specific CIDR block to an attacker-controlled instance.
4. Alternatively, the attacker uses ec2:ReplaceRouteTableAssociation to associate a subnet with a malicious route table they control, effectively hijacking traffic from that subnet.
5. To remove evidence or prevent legitimate access, the attacker might use ec2:DeleteRouteTable to delete a critical route table.
6. The attacker can also use ec2:DeleteRoute to remove specific routes which may impede their lateral movement or persistence.
7. The attacker uses ec2:DisassociateRouteTable to break existing subnet associations, disrupting network connectivity.
8. The final objective could be data exfiltration, denial of service, or maintaining long-term access to the compromised environment.

Impact

Successful modification or deletion of EC2 route tables can lead to significant disruptions in network traffic, potentially causing downtime for critical applications and services. Attackers can reroute sensitive data through their own infrastructure, enabling data theft or manipulation. This activity impacts cloud infrastructure and can lead to a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The risk is elevated if critical infrastructure components are affected, requiring immediate incident response to mitigate the damage and restore normal operations.

Recommendation

• Enable AWS CloudTrail and monitor ReplaceRoute, ReplaceRouteTableAssociation, DeleteRouteTable, DeleteRoute, and DisassociateRouteTable events to detect suspicious route table modifications or deletions as described in the overview.
• Deploy the Sigma rule "AWS EC2 Route Table Modified or Deleted" to your SIEM to detect unauthorized changes to route tables, ensuring to tune it for your specific environment.
• Investigate the aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn field to determine the user or role initiating the action and validate their authorization to perform these operations, as described in the rule documentation.
• Monitor the source.ip and user_agent.original fields in CloudTrail logs to identify unusual or suspicious sources of route table modifications as described in the investigation steps.
• Implement the principle of least privilege by limiting route table modification permissions to specific trusted users, roles, or automation accounts and using IAM conditions, referencing the remediation steps from the provided documentation.