{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/rmm/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":7.1,"id":"CVE-2026-6066"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":[],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["cve-2026-6066","connectwise","cleartext","rmm"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":[],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eConnectWise Automate is a remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform used by managed service providers (MSPs). CVE-2026-6066 describes a vulnerability in the ConnectWise Automate Solution Center where specific client-to-server communications may occur without transport-layer encryption. An attacker positioned on the network could intercept sensitive data transmitted in cleartext. This vulnerability was disclosed on April 20, 2026, and affects ConnectWise Automate versions prior to 2026.4. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to potentially gain access to credentials, configuration details, and other sensitive information related to the managed clients. The vulnerability has been resolved in Automate 2026.4 by enforcing secure communication for affected Solution Center connections.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker gains network access to a ConnectWise Automate deployment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker passively monitors network traffic for communications between Automate clients and the Solution Center.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker identifies vulnerable client-to-server communications occurring without transport-layer encryption.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker intercepts the cleartext network traffic using a packet capture tool such as Wireshark or tcpdump.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker analyzes the intercepted traffic to identify sensitive information such as credentials or configuration data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker uses the acquired credentials to gain unauthorized access to managed systems or customer environments.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker leverages compromised systems for lateral movement within the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of CVE-2026-6066 can lead to the compromise of ConnectWise Automate deployments, potentially affecting hundreds or thousands of MSP clients. An attacker could intercept credentials, configuration data, and other sensitive information, leading to unauthorized access to managed systems. This could result in data breaches, ransomware attacks, and other malicious activities targeting MSP clients. The severity is amplified by the widespread use of ConnectWise Automate among MSPs and the potential for cascading effects across their customer base.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade ConnectWise Automate to version 2026.4 or later to remediate CVE-2026-6066 as per the ConnectWise security bulletin (\u003ca href=\"https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-04-20-connectwise-automate-bulletin\"\u003ehttps://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-04-20-connectwise-automate-bulletin\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement network segmentation and monitoring to detect and prevent unauthorized network access and traffic interception.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule for unencrypted ConnectWise Automate communication to identify potentially vulnerable connections.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and enforce strong password policies and multi-factor authentication for all ConnectWise Automate accounts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-04-21T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2026-04-21T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2026-04-connectwise-cleartext/","summary":"ConnectWise Automate is vulnerable to CVE-2026-6066, a cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability, where certain client-to-server communications could occur without transport-layer encryption, potentially allowing network-based interception of Solution Center traffic, and the issue is resolved in Automate 2026.4 by enforcing secure communication.","title":"ConnectWise Automate Solution Center Cleartext Communication Vulnerability (CVE-2026-6066)","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-connectwise-cleartext/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":7.8,"id":"CVE-2026-22676"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":[],"_cs_severities":["critical"],"_cs_tags":["privilege-escalation","rmm","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":[],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eBarracuda RMM versions prior to 2025.2.2 contain a critical privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2026-22676). A local attacker can exploit overly permissive filesystem ACLs on the C:\\Windows\\Automation directory to achieve SYSTEM-level privileges. By modifying existing automation content or placing malicious, attacker-controlled files within this directory, the attacker can leverage the built-in automation functionality of Barracuda RMM. These files are then executed with NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM privileges during routine automation cycles, leading to full system compromise. This vulnerability allows an attacker with limited local access to escalate their privileges to the highest level on the system, potentially leading to lateral movement, data exfiltration, or system disruption.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker gains initial local access to the target system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker identifies the C:\\Windows\\Automation directory and confirms overly permissive ACLs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker crafts a malicious executable or script designed to execute commands with elevated privileges.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker modifies an existing automation script within the C:\\Windows\\Automation directory to execute their malicious code. Alternatively, the attacker places their malicious file directly into the C:\\Windows\\Automation directory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBarracuda RMM\u0026rsquo;s automation service executes the modified or newly added file during its regular automation cycle, running the attacker\u0026rsquo;s code under the NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM account.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker\u0026rsquo;s code executes, granting them SYSTEM-level privileges.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages SYSTEM privileges to install backdoors, create new administrative accounts, or perform other malicious actions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability grants a local attacker complete control over the affected system. This can lead to sensitive data theft, installation of ransomware, or use of the compromised system as a staging point for further attacks within the network. The lack of authentication and the ability to directly execute commands as SYSTEM makes this a highly critical vulnerability. Given the nature of RMM software, successful exploitation on one endpoint could be leveraged to compromise numerous systems managed by the RMM.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade Barracuda RMM to version 2025.2.2 or later to patch CVE-2026-22676.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor file modifications within the C:\\Windows\\Automation directory using the provided Sigma rule to detect suspicious activity.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement strict access control policies on the C:\\Windows\\Automation directory, limiting write access to only authorized accounts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview existing automation scripts for any unauthorized modifications.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-04-15T21:17:04Z","date_published":"2026-04-15T21:17:04Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-barracuda-privesc/","summary":"Barracuda RMM versions prior to 2025.2.2 are vulnerable to local privilege escalation, allowing attackers to gain SYSTEM privileges by exploiting overly permissive filesystem ACLs on the C:\\Windows\\Automation directory.","title":"Barracuda RMM Privilege Escalation via Filesystem ACLs","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-barracuda-privesc/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":[],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["rmm","command-and-control","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":[],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis brief focuses on the abuse of legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software by threat actors. RMM tools are often used for legitimate IT administration but can be leveraged for malicious purposes such as command and control, persistence, and lateral movement within a compromised network. This activity is identified by detecting DNS queries to a list of known RMM service domains originating from processes that are not typical web browsers. This behavior indicates that an RMM client, script, or other non-browser application is attempting to communicate with an RMM service. The detection rule was published on 2026-03-23 by Elastic and aims to surface unauthorized or malicious use of RMM tools within an organization. It is crucial to differentiate between legitimate and malicious RMM usage by analyzing the context of these DNS queries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to a Windows system through an unknown method.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker installs or deploys a legitimate RMM tool or a modified version.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe RMM agent is configured to communicate with the attacker\u0026rsquo;s command and control infrastructure.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA non-browser process (e.g., a script or a standalone executable) initiates a DNS query to resolve an RMM domain (e.g., teamviewer.com, anydesk.com).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe DNS query is resolved, establishing a network connection between the compromised system and the RMM service or attacker-controlled server.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages the RMM tool to execute commands, transfer files, and maintain persistent access to the compromised system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker performs lateral movement to other systems within the network, utilizing the RMM tool for remote administration.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves their objective, such as data exfiltration or ransomware deployment, using the established RMM connection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCompromise via RMM tools can lead to significant damage, including unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of business operations, and potential ransomware attacks. Successful exploitation allows attackers to maintain persistent access and control over affected systems, facilitating lateral movement and further malicious activities. The widespread use of RMM tools in various sectors makes this a broad threat. The impact can range from a single compromised workstation to the complete takeover of an organization\u0026rsquo;s IT infrastructure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the provided Sigma rule to your SIEM to detect DNS queries to RMM domains from non-browser processes and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview the IOC list of RMM domains and block any unauthorized RMM services at your DNS resolver.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule by examining the process tree and verifying the legitimacy of the process initiating the DNS query.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement application control policies to restrict the execution of unauthorized RMM tools on your endpoints.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon DNS event logging to activate the rules above.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-03-24T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2026-03-24T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2026-03-rmm-domain-dns/","summary":"Detection of DNS queries to known remote monitoring and management (RMM) domains originating from non-browser processes on Windows systems indicates potential abuse of legitimate software for command and control.","title":"DNS Queries to RMM Domains from Non-Browser Processes","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-03-rmm-domain-dns/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Elastic Defend","Elastic Endgame","Sysmon","AA_v*.exe","AeroAdmin.exe","AnyDesk.exe","apc_Admin.exe","apc_host.exe","AteraAgent.exe","aweray_remote*.exe","AweSun.exe","AgentMon.exe","B4-Service.exe","BASupSrvc.exe","bomgar-scc.exe","domotzagent.exe","domotz-windows-x64-10.exe","dwagsvc.exe","DWRCC.exe","ImperoClientSVC.exe","ImperoServerSVC.exe","ISLLight.exe","ISLLightClient.exe","fleetdeck_commander*.exe","getscreen.exe","g2aservice.exe","GoToAssistService.exe","gotohttp.exe","jumpcloud-agent.exe","level.exe","LvAgent.exe","LMIIgnition.exe","LogMeIn.exe","Lunixar.exe","LunixarRemote.exe","LunixarUpdater.exe","ManageEngine_Remote_Access_Plus.exe","MeshAgent.exe","Mikogo-Service.exe","NinjaRMMAgent.exe","NinjaRMMAgenPatcher.exe","ninjarmm-cli.exe","parsec.exe","PService.exe","quickassist.exe","r_server.exe","radmin.exe","radmin3.exe","RCClient.exe","RCService.exe","RemoteDesktopManager.exe","RemotePC.exe","RemotePCDesktop.exe","RemotePCService.exe","rfusclient.exe","ROMServer.exe","ROMViewer.exe","RPCSuite.exe","rserver3.exe","rustdesk.exe","rutserv.exe","rutview.exe","saazapsc.exe","ScreenConnect*.exe","session_win.exe","Remote Support.exe","smpcview.exe","spclink.exe","Splashtop-streamer.exe","Syncro.Overmind.Service.exe","SyncroLive.Agent.Runner.exe","SRService.exe","strwinclt.exe","Supremo.exe","SupremoService.exe","tacticalrmm.exe","tailscale.exe","tailscaled.exe","teamviewer.exe","ToDesk_Service.exe","twingate.exe","TiClientCore.exe","TSClient.exe","tvn.exe","tvnserver.exe","tvnviewer.exe","UltraVNC*.exe","UltraViewer*.exe","vncserver.exe","vncviewer.exe","winvnc.exe","winwvc.exe","Zaservice.exe","ZohoURS.exe","Velociraptor.exe","ToolsIQ.exe","CagService.exe","ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","TiAgent.exe","GoToResolveProcessChecker.exe","GoToResolveUnattended.exe","Syncro.Installer.exe"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["remote-access","rmm","command-and-control","persistence"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Elastic","Action1 Corporation","AeroAdmin LLC","Ammyy LLC","Atera Networks Ltd","AWERAY PTE. LTD.","BeamYourScreen GmbH","Bomgar Corporation","DUC FABULOUS CO.,LTD","DOMOTZ INC.","DWSNET OÜ","FleetDeck Inc","GlavSoft LLC","Hefei Pingbo Network Technology Co. Ltd","IDrive, Inc.","IMPERO SOLUTIONS LIMITED","Instant Housecall","ISL Online Ltd.","LogMeIn, Inc.","LUNIXAR SAS DE CV","MMSOFT Design Ltd.","Nanosystems S.r.l.","NetSupport Ltd","NinjaRMM, LLC","Parallels International GmbH","philandro Software GmbH","Pro Softnet Corporation","RealVNC","Remote Utilities LLC","Rocket Software, Inc.","SAFIB","Servably, Inc.","ShowMyPC INC","Splashtop Inc.","Superops Inc.","TeamViewer","Techinline Limited","uvnc bvba","Yakhnovets Denis Aleksandrovich IP","Zhou Huabing","ZOHO Corporation Private Limited","Connectwise, LLC","BreakingSecurity.net","Tailscale","Twingate","RustDesk","Zoho","JumpCloud","ScreenConnect","GoTo"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eAttackers commonly abuse legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools and remote access software for command and control (C2), persistence, and execution of native commands on compromised endpoints. These tools provide attackers with the ability to maintain access, execute commands, and move laterally within a network. This detection identifies when a process associated with commonly abused RMM/remote access tools is observed for the first time on a host. The rule is designed to trigger when a new process name or code signature associated with RMM software, or a child process of such software, is seen within a configured history window. This helps defenders quickly identify potentially malicious use of legitimate tools.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInitial Access: The attacker gains initial access to a target system through various methods, such as exploiting vulnerabilities or using compromised credentials.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTool Deployment: The attacker deploys a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool or remote access software on the compromised endpoint. This may involve downloading and installing the tool, or exploiting existing installations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePersistence: The RMM tool is configured to run persistently on the system, ensuring that the attacker maintains access even after a reboot or other disruption. This may involve creating a service or adding a registry key to ensure the tool starts automatically.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCommand and Control: The attacker uses the RMM tool to establish a command and control (C2) channel with the compromised system. This allows them to remotely execute commands, transfer files, and monitor activity on the system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLateral Movement: Using the RMM tool, the attacker moves laterally within the network, compromising additional systems and escalating their access. This may involve using the tool to access shared resources or execute commands on other systems.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eData Exfiltration or Ransomware Deployment: The attacker uses their access to exfiltrate sensitive data from the compromised network or deploy ransomware to encrypt files and demand a ransom payment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCleanup: The attacker may attempt to remove traces of their activity, such as logs or files associated with the RMM tool, to avoid detection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCompromise via RMM tools can lead to significant data breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage. The use of legitimate tools makes detection more difficult. Successful attacks can result in ransomware deployment, data theft, and prolonged unauthorized access to sensitive systems. Organizations in all sectors are potentially at risk.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the process creation rule to detect the execution of RMM tools on endpoints based on \u003ccode\u003eprocess.name\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eprocess.code_signature.subject_name\u003c/code\u003e criteria in the query.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) to ensure the collection of necessary event data for the detection rule.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the detection rule to determine whether the execution of the RMM tool is authorized and legitimate. Refer to the references for a list of commonly abused RMM tools and associated indicators.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-24T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-24T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-first-time-seen-rmm/","summary":"Detects the execution of previously unseen remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools or remote access software on compromised Windows endpoints, often leveraged for command-and-control, persistence, and execution of malicious commands.","title":"First Time Seen Remote Monitoring and Management Tool Execution","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-first-time-seen-rmm/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Elastic Defend","Sysmon","Chrome","Edge","Firefox","Safari","Brave Browser","Opera Browser","Vivaldi Browser","WebView2"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["command-and-control","rmm","dns"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Elastic","Microsoft","Mozilla","Apple","Brave","Opera","Vivaldi"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection identifies potentially malicious use of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools by detecting DNS queries to known RMM domains originating from processes that are not web browsers. Attackers frequently abuse legitimate RMM software for command and control, persistence, and lateral movement within compromised networks. This rule focuses on surfacing RMM clients, scripts, or other non-browser activity contacting these services, thereby increasing the likelihood of detecting unauthorized remote access or malicious activity. The rule aims to reduce false positives by excluding common browser processes and focusing on unusual network activity. The identified domains are associated with various RMM tools like TeamViewer, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect. This detection is relevant for organizations concerned about insider threats, supply chain attacks, or general compromise leading to unauthorized remote access.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to a system, possibly through phishing or exploiting a vulnerability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker installs an unauthorized RMM tool (e.g., using a script or installer).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe RMM tool initiates a DNS query to resolve its command and control domain (e.g., teamviewer.com).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe system, now running the RMM agent, establishes a connection to the attacker-controlled RMM server.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the RMM tool to execute commands on the compromised system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the RMM tool for lateral movement within the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the RMM tool to maintain persistence on the compromised system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCompromise via unauthorized RMM tools can provide attackers with persistent remote access, enabling them to perform a range of malicious activities, including data theft, ransomware deployment, and further lateral movement within the network. Successful exploitation can lead to significant financial loss, reputational damage, and disruption of business operations. The number of affected systems can vary depending on the scope of the initial compromise and the attacker\u0026rsquo;s ability to move laterally.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eRMM Domain DNS Queries from Non-Browser Processes\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune it to your environment, excluding legitimate non-browser processes that use RMM tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the rule, focusing on identifying the process making the DNS query and its parent process, as outlined in the rule\u0026rsquo;s description.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor DNS query logs for queries to the RMM domains listed in the IOC table, and block them at the DNS resolver if unauthorized RMM use is confirmed.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon Event ID 22 (DNS Query) logging to provide the necessary data for this detection, as recommended in the \u0026ldquo;Setup\u0026rdquo; section of the content.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-rmm-domain-dns/","summary":"Detects DNS queries to commonly abused remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote access software domains from non-browser processes, potentially indicating unauthorized remote access or command and control activity.","title":"RMM Domain DNS Queries from Non-Browser Processes","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-rmm-domain-dns/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Microsoft Defender XDR"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["command and control","rmm","msi","windows","remote access"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection identifies a suspicious sequence of events where an MSI installer is executed, followed by the launch of remote management software (RMM) such as ScreenConnect, Syncro, or VNC. Attackers may leverage this technique to gain unauthorized access to systems by first installing malicious software via an MSI package, and then using the RMM software to establish a remote connection. The rule specifically looks for msiexec.exe being run with an install argument (/i) followed by the execution of known RMM tools within a short timeframe. This behavior is often indicative of malicious actors attempting to establish persistent remote access to compromised machines. The detection is designed for Windows environments and covers a range of data sources including Elastic Defend, Sysmon, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender XDR, and Crowdstrike.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to a system through various means (e.g., social engineering, compromised website, or existing malware).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker deploys a malicious MSI installer to the victim machine. This can be done through phishing attachments or drive-by downloads.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe user executes the MSI installer (msiexec.exe) with an installation argument (/i or -i). The parent process is typically explorer.exe or sihost.exe, indicating user-initiated installation.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe MSI installer executes, potentially installing malware or modifying system settings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWithin one minute of the MSI installation, a remote management software (RMM) client is launched, such as ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe, Syncro.Installer.exe, tvnserver.exe, or winvnc.exe.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe RMM client attempts to establish an outbound connection to a remote server controlled by the attacker, often using pre-configured access keys.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker gains remote access to the compromised system via the RMM client. In the case of ScreenConnect, the attacker may use a guest link with a known session key.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker performs malicious activities, such as data exfiltration, lateral movement, or installing additional malware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to gain persistent remote access to compromised systems. This can lead to data theft, financial fraud, or disruption of services. Depending on the scope of the initial access, the attacker may be able to move laterally within the network, compromising additional systems. The use of RMM software can mask malicious activity as legitimate remote support, making detection more difficult.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable process creation logging via Sysmon or Windows Security Event Logs to capture the execution of msiexec.exe and RMM tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the \u0026ldquo;Remote Management Access Launch After MSI Install\u0026rdquo; Sigma rule to your SIEM and tune the timeframe (maxspan) to suit your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by this rule, focusing on the source of the MSI file and the destination of the RMM connection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBlock the execution of unauthorized RMM software on your network based on process name, as identified in the rule (ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe, Syncro.Installer.exe, tvnserver.exe, winvnc.exe).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor network connections for RMM software connecting to unusual or external IPs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-rmm-after-msi/","summary":"Detects an MSI installer execution followed by the execution of commonly abused Remote Management Software like ScreenConnect, potentially indicating abuse where an attacker triggers an MSI install then connects via a guest link with a known session key.","title":"Remote Management Access Launch After MSI Install","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-rmm-after-msi/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","AteraAgent","AweSun","APC Admin","APC Host","BeyondTrust Remote Support","Bomgar","Remote Support","B4-Service","CagService","Domotz Agent","dwagsvc","DWRCC","FleetDeck Commander","GetScreen","GoToAssist","GoToResolve","ImperoClient","ImperoServer","ISLLight","ISLLightClient","JumpCloud Agent","Level","LvAgent","LMIIgnition","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine Remote Access Plus","MeshAgent","Mikogo","NinjaRMM","parsec","PService","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","RemoteDesktopManager","RCClient","RCService","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","saazapsc","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","Syncro","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["remote-access-tool","command-and-control","rmm","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","Atera","AweSun","APC","BeyondTrust","BarracudaRMM","Domotz","DWService","FleetDeck","GetScreen","GoTo","Impero","ISLOnline","JumpCloud","Level","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine","MeshCentral","Mikogo","NinjaOne","Parsec","Pulseway","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","Devolutions","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","Kaseya","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies Windows systems running multiple Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools from different vendors within an eight-minute timeframe. While legitimate MSP environments might utilize several tools, the presence of multiple RMM solutions on a single host can signify a compromise, unauthorized software installation (shadow IT), or attackers establishing redundant access points. The rule maps process names to vendor labels to avoid inflated counts from multiple binaries of the same vendor. This activity has been observed as a component of broader attack campaigns, including those leveraging compromised MSP infrastructure, and is described in CISA AA23-025A. The timeframe analyzed is \u0026ldquo;now-9m\u0026rdquo;, and the rule triggers if two or more different vendors are detected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInitial Access: The attacker gains initial access to the system, possibly through phishing, exploiting vulnerabilities, or stolen credentials.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTool Deployment: The attacker deploys an initial RMM tool (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) for remote access and control.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePersistence: The attacker establishes persistence by configuring the RMM tool to start automatically on system boot.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLateral Movement: The attacker uses the initial access to discover other systems on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAdditional RMM Deployment: The attacker deploys a second RMM tool (e.g., ScreenConnect, Splashtop) from a different vendor to create a redundant access method.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePrivilege Escalation: The attacker escalates privileges using the compromised RMM tools, if necessary.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRemote Control: The attacker uses the RMM tools to remotely control the system, execute commands, and access sensitive data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eData Exfiltration or Further Exploitation: The attacker exfiltrates sensitive data or uses the compromised system to launch further attacks on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack leveraging multiple RMM tools can result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, system compromise, and lateral movement within the network. The presence of multiple RMM tools increases the attacker\u0026rsquo;s resilience, making it harder to detect and remediate the intrusion. Affected systems can be used as a staging ground for further attacks, leading to significant financial and reputational damage. This can impact any Windows-based system, and the CISA advisory AA23-025A specifically highlights the risk of MSP infrastructure compromise.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eMultiple RMM Vendors on Same Host\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate hosts triggering the rule to confirm legitimate use of multiple RMM tools. Check \u003ccode\u003eEsql.vendors_seen\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eEsql.processes_name_values\u003c/code\u003e for insight into the involved tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview asset inventory and change tickets to verify authorized RMM software installations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIsolate any unauthorized or unexplained hosts and remove unapproved RMM tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnforce a single approved RMM stack per asset class where possible.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) on Windows endpoints to enhance detection capabilities as described in the rule\u0026rsquo;s setup instructions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-multiple-rmm-vendors/","summary":"This rule identifies Windows hosts where two or more distinct remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote-access tool vendors are observed starting processes within the same eight-minute window, potentially indicating compromise, shadow IT, or attacker staging of redundant access.","title":"Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-multiple-rmm-vendors/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","Atera Agent","AweSun","APC Admin","APC Host","BeyondTrust","Remote Support","BarracudaRMM","Domotz Agent","DWService","FleetDeck Commander","GetScreen","GoTo","Impero Client","Impero Server","ISLLight","ISLLightClient","JumpCloud Agent","Level","LvAgent","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine Remote Access Plus","MeshAgent","Mikogo","NinjaRMMAgent","NinjaRMMAgenPatcher","ninjarmm-cli","Parsec","Pulseway","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","RemoteDesktopManager","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","Kaseya","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","SyncroLive","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["command-and-control","rmm","windows","threat-detection"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AeroAdmin","AnyDesk","Atera","AweSun","APC","BeyondTrust","BarracudaRMM","Domotz","DWService","FleetDeck","GetScreen","GoTo","Impero","ISLOnline","JumpCloud","Level","LogMeIn","Lunixar","ManageEngine","MeshCentral","Mikogo","NinjaOne","Parsec","Pulseway","Radmin","RealVNC","RemotePC","Devolutions","RPCSuite","RustDesk","RemoteUtilities","Kaseya","ScreenConnect","Splashtop","Supremo","TacticalRMM","Tailscale","TeamViewer","Tiflux","ToDesk","Twingate","TightVNC","UltraVNC","UltraViewer","AnyAssist","Velociraptor","ToolsIQ","ZohoAssist"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies Windows hosts running multiple remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools from different vendors within an eight-minute timeframe. While legitimate MSP environments may utilize multiple tools, this activity can also indicate malicious behavior, such as an attacker establishing redundant access to a compromised system. The rule maps various RMM processes to vendor labels, ensuring that multiple binaries from the same vendor do not inflate the count. The processes monitored include popular RMM tools like TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and many others. This rule is designed to detect suspicious activity within the environment and alert security teams to potential compromises. The timeframe is set to eight minutes to reduce false positives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInitial Access: An attacker gains initial access to a Windows host, possibly through phishing or exploitation of a vulnerability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTool Deployment: The attacker deploys an initial RMM tool for remote access and control.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSecondary Tool Deployment: The attacker deploys a second RMM tool from a different vendor to ensure redundant access in case the first tool is detected or removed.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePrivilege Escalation: The attacker escalates privileges to gain SYSTEM or Administrator rights, if necessary, to maintain persistent access and control.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLateral Movement: The attacker uses the RMM tools to move laterally within the network to access additional systems and data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eData Exfiltration/Malicious Activity: The attacker uses the established RMM connections to exfiltrate sensitive data or perform other malicious activities such as deploying ransomware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, potentially resulting in data breaches, financial loss, and reputational damage. This detection rule helps identify hosts that might be compromised by malicious actors utilizing multiple RMM tools for command and control. Identifying potentially compromised systems is key to preventing widespread damage.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rules in this brief to your SIEM to detect multiple RMM tools running on the same host within an eight-minute window.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate systems triggering this alert by reviewing process execution logs and network connections to identify the source of the RMM tool installation.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnforce a policy of a single approved RMM stack per asset class to minimize the risk of unauthorized RMM tool usage.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTune the provided Sigma rules with host or organizational unit exceptions for legitimate MSP/IT tooling environments.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview asset inventory and change tickets for approved RMM software to identify unauthorized installations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-02T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-02T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-02-multiple-rmm-vendors/","summary":"This detection identifies a Windows host where two or more distinct remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote-access tool vendors are observed starting processes within the same eight-minute window, potentially indicating compromise, shadow IT, or attacker staging of redundant access.","title":"Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-02-multiple-rmm-vendors/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Rmm","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}