{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/remotemonologue/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["MsMpEng.exe","Windows Defender","TeamViewer","SentinelOne Cloud Funnel","Microsoft Defender XDR"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["remotemonologue","defense-evasion","persistence","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","TeamViewer","SentinelOne"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe RemoteMonologue attack technique abuses Component Object Model (COM) objects to coerce authentication from a remote system. This is achieved by modifying the \u003ccode\u003eRunAs\u003c/code\u003e registry value associated with a COM object. Setting this value to \u0026ldquo;Interactive User\u0026rdquo; forces the COM object to run under the context of the interactive user, enabling attackers to hijack sessions and potentially escalate privileges. This technique is often used as a defense evasion or persistence mechanism by adversaries after gaining initial access to a system. The attack involves modifying registry keys associated with COM objects to trigger NTLM authentication coercion. This can be used for lateral movement and gaining access to sensitive resources. This rule is designed to detect registry modifications indicative of the RemoteMonologue attack.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInitial Access: An attacker gains initial access to the target system through unspecified means.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIdentify COM Objects: The attacker identifies suitable COM objects for abuse.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eModify Registry: The attacker modifies the registry to set the \u003ccode\u003eRunAs\u003c/code\u003e value for the selected COM object to \u003ccode\u003eInteractive User\u003c/code\u003e. This involves modifying the registry path \u003ccode\u003eHKCR\\AppID\\{Clsid}\\RunAs\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTrigger COM Object Execution: The attacker triggers the execution of the modified COM object, potentially through a remote procedure call or other inter-process communication mechanisms.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAuthentication Coercion: The execution of the COM object triggers NTLM authentication to a system controlled by the attacker.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRelay Attack: The attacker relays the coerced NTLM authentication to gain access to other resources on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSession Hijacking: Successful relay leads to session hijacking, allowing the attacker to impersonate the user.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLateral Movement/Privilege Escalation: The attacker uses the hijacked session for lateral movement or privilege escalation within the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful RemoteMonologue attack can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data. By coercing authentication and hijacking sessions, attackers can bypass security controls and escalate their privileges within the network. The scope of the impact depends on the privileges of the hijacked user account and the resources accessible to that account. This attack can enable lateral movement, data exfiltration, and other malicious activities.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eDetect RemoteMonologue Registry Modification\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM to identify suspicious registry modifications related to COM object hijacking.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon registry event logging to capture the necessary data for the Sigma rules to function effectively.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule by reviewing the registry event logs and identifying the user account and process responsible for the registry modification.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement enhanced monitoring on critical systems to detect any attempts to modify COM object registry settings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBlock the attack by ensuring \u0026ldquo;RunAs\u0026rdquo; value is not set to \u0026ldquo;Interactive User\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T14:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T14:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-remotemonologue-regmod/","summary":"This rule detects potential RemoteMonologue attacks by identifying attempts to perform session hijacking via COM object registry modification, specifically when the RunAs value is set to Interactive User.","title":"Potential RemoteMonologue Attack via Registry Modification","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-remotemonologue-regmod/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Remotemonologue","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}