Rclone

This brief details the detection of `rclone.exe` command-line usage with arguments indicative of file transfer to cloud services, a technique frequently leveraged by threat actors for data exfiltration during ransomware and other attacks, which can lead to data breaches and sensitive information loss.

This detection identifies the malicious use of 'rclone', a legitimate file synchronization utility, for data exfiltration or cloud abuse by flagging `rclone.exe` execution when specific suspicious command-line arguments are used, such as those indicating synchronization to remote cloud storage providers like `mega:`, `ftp:`, or generic `remote:`, especially in conjunction with flags like `--transfers`, `--ignore-existing`, or `--auto-confirm`, which is a critical indicator of compromise abused by threat actors for stealthy data exfiltration.

A remote, authenticated attacker can exploit multiple vulnerabilities in rclone to gain unauthorized capabilities, allowing them to read and write arbitrary files on the system, disclose sensitive information, and bypass existing security mechanisms, potentially leading to data compromise or system integrity issues.

Multiple vulnerabilities in rclone could be exploited by an attacker to bypass security measures and execute arbitrary program code, potentially leading to complete system compromise.

Attackers are abusing the legitimate file synchronization tool rclone, often renamed to masquerade as legitimate software, to exfiltrate data to cloud storage or remote endpoints.

Rclone is vulnerable to an unauthenticated options/set vulnerability that allows runtime authentication bypass, potentially leading to sensitive operations and command execution by setting `rc.NoAuth=true` on reachable RC servers started without global HTTP authentication.

The rule detects the abuse of rclone, a legitimate file synchronization tool, potentially renamed to evade detection, to exfiltrate data to cloud storage or remote endpoints, using copy/sync commands and specific file filters.