Rag — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/rag/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioThu, 18 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000Open WebUI Knowledge Base Destruction and RAG Poisoning via Unauthorized Collection Overwritehttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-18-open-webui-rag-poisoning/Thu, 18 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-18-open-webui-rag-poisoning/Open WebUI is vulnerable to knowledge base destruction and RAG poisoning due to a lack of authorization checks on the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` endpoint, allowing an attacker to overwrite a victim's knowledge base with attacker-controlled content.Open WebUI, a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) application, is susceptible to unauthorized knowledge base modification. The vulnerability lies in the process_web endpoint within backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py. Specifically, the POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint lacks authorization checks, which allows any authenticated user with knowledge of a target knowledge base UUID to overwrite it with arbitrary content. This is possible due to the overwrite parameter, which defaults to True and triggers the deletion of the existing vector collection before new content is written via the save_docs_to_vector_db function. The issue affects the current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with RAG functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to poison the RAG system by injecting malicious content into the knowledge base.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker gains a valid user account on the Open WebUI instance.
  2. Attacker discovers the victim’s knowledge base UUID, potentially through the knowledge-bases meta-collection (as mentioned in the report).
  3. Attacker crafts a POST request to the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, setting the collection_name parameter to the victim’s KB UUID and ensures overwrite=true.
  4. The POST request includes a url parameter pointing to an attacker-controlled URL containing malicious content.
  5. The Open WebUI server fetches the content from the attacker-controlled URL.
  6. The save_docs_to_vector_db function is called, which first deletes the existing vector collection associated with the victim’s knowledge base.
  7. The fetched content from the attacker’s URL is then embedded and stored as the new content for the knowledge base.
  8. When the victim queries their knowledge base, the RAG system returns the attacker-controlled content, leading to potential misinformation or malicious actions.

Impact

Successful exploitation leads to data destruction, where the victim’s original knowledge base embeddings are permanently deleted from the vector store. Furthermore, the RAG system is poisoned with attacker-controlled content, causing the LLM to return misleading or malicious responses. This can enable indirect prompt injection and manipulation of the victim’s LLM behavior. The poisoned content persists until the knowledge base is rebuilt from the original source files, creating a persistent vulnerability. Versions of open-webui up to and including 0.8.12 are affected.

Recommendation

  • Apply authorization checks to the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint to verify that the user has write access to the target collection, mitigating CVE-2026-44554.
  • Monitor webserver logs for POST requests to /api/v1/retrieval/process/web with suspicious collection_name parameters, using the Sigma rule “Detect Open WebUI Unauthorized Collection Overwrite Attempt” to identify potential exploitation attempts.
  • Inspect network traffic for connections to suspicious URLs used in the url parameter of the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, such as the IOC https://attacker.com/poison.
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