<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Pull-Request — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/pull-request/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 13:22:02 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/pull-request/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>CoreShop Remote Code Execution via Malicious Pull Request</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-coreshop-rce/</link><pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 13:22:02 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-coreshop-rce/</guid><description>CoreShop is vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via insecure `pull_request_target` configuration, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the GitHub Actions runner by submitting a malicious pull request and potentially exfiltrate secrets or modify repository contents; tracked as CVE-2026-41249.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>CoreShop is vulnerable to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2026-41249) due to an insecure configuration of the <code>pull_request_target</code> trigger in its GitHub Actions workflow (<code>.github/workflows/static.yml</code>). The workflow dangerously checks out unverified code from the pull request head (<code>ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}</code>) and executes a script (<code>bin/console</code>) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request, also known as a &ldquo;Pwn Request&rdquo; vulnerability. The vulnerable version is confirmed to be 5.0.0 of the CoreShop component.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>An attacker forks the target CoreShop repository.</li>
<li>The attacker modifies a file within the forked repository that satisfies the <code>paths</code> condition defined in the <code>static.yml</code> workflow, such as <code>src/dummy.php</code> or <code>composer.json</code>.</li>
<li>The attacker crafts a malicious payload and injects it into the <code>bin/console</code> file within their forked repository. This payload is designed to execute arbitrary commands on the GitHub Actions runner.</li>
<li>The attacker commits the changes, including the modified <code>bin/console</code> file, to their forked repository.</li>
<li>The attacker opens a pull request (PR) targeting the <code>5.0</code> or <code>next</code> branch of the original CoreShop repository.</li>
<li>The <code>Static Tests</code> workflow is automatically triggered upon receiving the pull request.</li>
<li>The workflow executes the <code>bin/console</code> script from the attacker&rsquo;s branch, resulting in the execution of the malicious payload within the GitHub Actions runner environment.</li>
<li>The attacker obtains RCE within the runner&rsquo;s context, gaining access to secrets and potentially modifying repository contents.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code within the GitHub Actions runner environment. Because <code>pull_request_target</code> runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., <code>PIMCORE_SECRET</code>, <code>PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY</code>) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner&rsquo;s computing resources. This can lead to sensitive data exposure, code tampering, and resource hijacking.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Modify the GitHub Actions workflow (<code>.github/workflows/static.yml</code>) to avoid checking out untrusted PR code (<code>head.ref</code>) when using <code>pull_request_target</code>.</li>
<li>Implement a separated architecture using the <code>workflow_run</code> event, as suggested in the overview.</li>
<li>Monitor GitHub Actions logs for suspicious execution of <code>bin/console</code> with unexpected commands, using the detection rules provided below.</li>
<li>Apply the recommended mitigation from the advisory (<a href="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h)">https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h)</a>.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>github-actions</category><category>rce</category><category>pull-request</category></item></channel></rss>