Attack Chain

1. An attacker authenticates to the OpenClaw application with operator.write privileges.
2. The attacker leverages their access to the browser.request Gateway method.
3. The attacker crafts a POST request to the /reset-profile endpoint. The request body includes the target profile name.
4. The browser.request method incorrectly forwards the request to the browser route dispatcher due to a missing check in the isPersistentBrowserProfileMutation(...) helper.
5. The exposed browser server route maps /reset-profile to profileCtx.resetProfile().
6. The resetProfile() function is executed, stopping the running browser, closing the Playwright browser connection, and moving the profile's userDataDir to Trash.
7. The target browser profile is reset, leading to data loss and service disruption for the user associated with that profile.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker with operator.write access to reset arbitrary browser profiles. This results in the targeted browser being stopped, the Playwright browser connection being closed, and the profile's local data directory being moved to the trash. This leads to a loss of persistent browser state, potential data loss, and disruption of service for users relying on the affected browser profiles.

Recommendation

• Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.3.24 or later to patch the vulnerability.
• Deploy the Sigma rule Detect OpenClaw Unauthorized Profile Reset to detect exploitation attempts by monitoring for POST requests to /reset-profile originating from browser.request with operator.write privileges.
• Review the source code locations src/gateway/server-methods/browser.ts and src/node-host/invoke-browser.ts to ensure all profile-management routes are correctly classified and protected.
• Implement regression testing with a deny control for POST /reset-profile on the browser.request surface to prevent future regressions.