<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Ping — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/ping/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Tue, 02 Jan 2024 14:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/ping/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Windows Delayed Execution via Ping Followed by Malicious Utilities</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-delayed-execution-via-ping/</link><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jan 2024 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-delayed-execution-via-ping/</guid><description>Adversaries may use ping to delay execution of malicious commands, scripts, or binaries to evade detection, often observed during malware installation.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Attackers may use ping to introduce pauses, allowing them to execute harmful scripts or binaries stealthily. This delayed execution is often observed during malware installation and is consistent with an attacker attempting to evade detection. The adversary uses <code>ping.exe</code> with the <code>-n</code> argument from within a <code>cmd.exe</code> shell, and the parent process is running under a user context other than SYSTEM. The subsequent process is <code>cmd.exe</code> invoking a known malicious utility, such as <code>powershell.exe</code>, <code>mshta.exe</code>, <code>rundll32.exe</code>, or an executable from the user&rsquo;s AppData directory without a valid code signature. This behavior is often observed during malware installation.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>The attack begins with an initial access vector (not specified in source).</li>
<li>The adversary executes <code>cmd.exe</code>.</li>
<li><code>cmd.exe</code> spawns <code>ping.exe</code> with the <code>-n</code> argument to introduce a delay, typically to evade detection (<code>ping.exe -n [number] 127.0.0.1</code>).</li>
<li>After the delay introduced by <code>ping.exe</code>, the same <code>cmd.exe</code> process executes a potentially malicious utility such as <code>powershell.exe</code>, <code>mshta.exe</code>, <code>rundll32.exe</code>, <code>certutil.exe</code>, or <code>regsvr32.exe</code>.</li>
<li>Alternatively, <code>cmd.exe</code> might execute a binary located within the user&rsquo;s AppData directory that lacks a valid code signature.</li>
<li>The malicious utility executes arbitrary commands or scripts, potentially downloading further payloads or modifying system configurations.</li>
<li>The attacker gains a foothold on the system, enabling further malicious activities such as lateral movement or data exfiltration.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>A successful attack can lead to malware installation, system compromise, and data theft. While the source does not quantify the number of victims or specific sectors targeted, a successful compromise can lead to significant operational disruption and data breaches. The use of delayed execution makes it more difficult for traditional security solutions to detect malicious activity.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Deploy the Sigma rule &ldquo;Delayed Execution via Ping&rdquo; to your SIEM to detect the execution of commonly abused Windows utilities via a delayed Ping execution.</li>
<li>Enable process monitoring with command-line argument logging to capture the execution of <code>ping.exe</code> and subsequent processes for analysis.</li>
<li>Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution of scripts and binaries, focusing on the utilities identified in the rule.</li>
<li>Review and tune the provided Sigma rule, including the listed exclusions, to reduce false positives in your specific environment.</li>
<li>Monitor process execution from unusual locations like the AppData directory, especially for unsigned executables, as indicated in the rule&rsquo;s detection logic.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">low</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>execution</category><category>defense-evasion</category><category>windows</category><category>ping</category><category>lolbas</category></item></channel></rss>