{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/password-recovery/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["AWS"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["aws","cloudtrail","initial-access","password-recovery"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AWS"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis threat brief focuses on detecting password recovery requests initiated for the AWS root account. The AWS root account is a highly privileged account, and any unauthorized access or modification attempts should be treated with utmost urgency. The detection mechanism relies on analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for \u003ccode\u003ePasswordRecoveryRequested\u003c/code\u003e events originating from \u003ccode\u003esignin.amazonaws.com\u003c/code\u003e. These events are exclusive to the root user's \u0026quot;Forgot your password?\u0026quot; workflow, differentiating them from password resets for IAM users or federated identities. Successful detection of a password recovery request necessitates immediate investigation to confirm its legitimacy and prevent potential account compromise. This alert matters because unauthorized root account access can lead to complete control over an organization's AWS infrastructure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInitial Access:\u003c/strong\u003e An attacker attempts to gain access to the AWS account, potentially through phishing, credential stuffing, or other initial access vectors.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePassword Recovery Request:\u003c/strong\u003e The attacker initiates the \u0026quot;Forgot your password?\u0026quot; flow for the root account at \u003ccode\u003esignin.amazonaws.com\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCloudTrail Logging:\u003c/strong\u003e AWS logs the \u003ccode\u003ePasswordRecoveryRequested\u003c/code\u003e event with \u003ccode\u003eevent.provider:signin.amazonaws.com\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eevent.action:PasswordRecoveryRequested\u003c/code\u003e in CloudTrail.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEmail Notification:\u003c/strong\u003e AWS sends a password reset email to the email address associated with the root account.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCredential Reset:\u003c/strong\u003e If the attacker gains access to the email, they can click the password reset link and set a new password for the root account.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSuccessful Login:\u003c/strong\u003e The attacker uses the newly reset password to log in to the AWS console as the root user. This generates a \u003ccode\u003eConsoleLogin\u003c/code\u003e event.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePrivilege Escalation:\u003c/strong\u003e Once logged in, the attacker can perform administrative actions, such as creating new IAM users with elevated privileges, modifying security policies, or accessing sensitive data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Exfiltration / Damage:\u003c/strong\u003e The attacker exfiltrates sensitive data, deploys malicious infrastructure, or otherwise compromises the environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack leveraging a compromised AWS root account can have catastrophic consequences. The root user has unrestricted access to all AWS resources within the account, enabling attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data, disrupt critical services, deploy ransomware, or completely take over the environment. Depending on the organization's size and reliance on AWS, the impact can range from financial losses and reputational damage to complete business disruption. The number of potential victims is vast, as many organizations rely on AWS for their cloud infrastructure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eDetect AWS Root Password Recovery\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect password recovery requests.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any triggered alerts from the \u003ccode\u003eDetect AWS Root Password Recovery\u003c/code\u003e rule by validating the source IP address and user agent.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable multi-factor authentication (MFA) on the root account to prevent unauthorized access, as documented in the AWS documentation link provided in the references.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor for subsequent \u003ccode\u003eConsoleLogin\u003c/code\u003e events after a \u003ccode\u003ePasswordRecoveryRequested\u003c/code\u003e event to detect potential unauthorized logins using the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eDetect AWS Root Login After Password Reset\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview AWS CloudTrail logs for related events such as \u003ccode\u003eCreateAccessKey\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eCreateUser\u003c/code\u003e, or \u003ccode\u003eAttachUserPolicy\u003c/code\u003e shortly after a password recovery request.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-30T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-30T12:00:00Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-root-password-recovery/","summary":"Detection of AWS root account password recovery requests, potentially indicating unauthorized access attempts or legitimate administrative actions requiring verification.","title":"AWS Root Account Password Recovery Request Detection","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-root-password-recovery/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Password-Recovery","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}