Openhands - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/openhands/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioTue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000OpenHands Command Injection Vulnerability in Git Diff Handlerhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-02-openhands-command-injection/Tue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-02-openhands-command-injection/A command injection vulnerability exists in OpenHands' `get_git_diff()` method, allowing authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands in the agent sandbox via the `/api/conversations/{conversation_id}/git/diff` endpoint by exploiting the unsanitized `path` parameter.OpenHands is vulnerable to command injection due to insufficient sanitization of the path parameter in the /api/conversations/{conversation_id}/git/diff API endpoint. This endpoint, handled by the get_git_diff() method within openhands/runtime/utils/git_handler.py, allows authenticated users to pass arbitrary commands to the underlying shell. The vulnerability exists because the file_path parameter is directly interpolated into a shell command string using Python's .format() method without sanitization, allowing for the interpretation of shell metacharacters. This bypasses the normal agent command execution channels and provides a direct path for attackers to execute code within the agent sandbox. The affected versions are pip/openhands < 1.5.0. This vulnerability was reported on 2026-03-25.

Attack Chain

  1. An authenticated user sends a crafted HTTP GET request to the /api/conversations/{conversation_id}/git/diff endpoint.
  2. The request includes a malicious path parameter containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &).
  3. The git_diff function in openhands/server/routes/files.py receives the path parameter.
  4. The path parameter is passed unsanitized to the runtime.get_git_diff function.
  5. The get_git_diff function in openhands/runtime/base.py then calls self.git_handler.get_git_diff(file_path).
  6. Within openhands/runtime/utils/git_handler.py, the file_path is directly inserted into the GIT_DIFF_CMD string using .format() without sanitization.
  7. The resulting command string is executed via subprocess.run with shell=True in openhands/runtime/utils/git_diff.py, enabling shell metacharacter interpretation.
  8. The attacker-supplied commands are executed on the system, achieving arbitrary code execution.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the runtime container as root, leading to significant compromise. Attackers can read sensitive files (e.g., .env, API keys, source code), write arbitrary files, inject malicious code, establish reverse shells for persistent access, and potentially escape the container if Docker is misconfigured. This impacts all OpenHands deployments exposing the vulnerable endpoint.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade OpenHands to the latest version that includes the fix from PR #13051 to address the command injection vulnerability.
  • Deploy the Sigma rule Detect OpenHands Git Diff Command Injection Attempt to your SIEM to detect exploitation attempts based on shell metacharacters in the path parameter.
  • Implement input validation and sanitization for the path parameter in the /api/conversations/{conversation_id}/git/diff endpoint to prevent shell metacharacters from being processed.
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