{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","favicon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.png","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/obsidian-tc/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","icon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/apple-touch-icon.png","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:obsidian:obsidian-tc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"_cs_cves":[{"id":"CVE-2026-115477"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["obsidian-tc (\u003e= 1.13.0, \u003c= 1.31.3)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["vulnerability","hitl-bypass","obsidian-tc"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Obsidian"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eA vulnerability (CVE-2026-115477) exists in the obsidian-tc server component (v1.13.0 through v1.31.3) where the server fails to properly validate human-in-the-loop (HITL) confirmation responses. When a client performs a dispatch-gated tool call, the server issues an \u003ccode\u003einputRequired\u003c/code\u003e confirmation challenge. Due to a flaw in the validation logic, the server trusts the echoed \u003ccode\u003erequestState\u003c/code\u003e provided by the client upon resubmission as proof of approval, even if the user previously declined the action. A malicious or non-compliant client can echo this state to bypass the user's explicit refusal, allowing destructive operations such as file deletion, cross-folder moves, and frontmatter replacements.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows for unauthorized execution of destructive vault operations that a user explicitly declined. The impact is limited to dispatch-gated tools configured with \u003ccode\u003edestructive: true\u003c/code\u003e or HITL floor scopes. The server cannot verify if a client actually rendered the form to the human, meaning an attacker-controlled client can simply provide an approval response regardless of human input.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePatch obsidian-tc to version 1.31.4 or later immediately.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFor environments unable to patch, transition to stdio-based deployments or unset \u003ccode\u003eauth.jwtSecret\u003c/code\u003e to force usage of the legacy CLI-based \u003ccode\u003eelicit_token\u003c/code\u003e mechanism.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAudit logs for suspicious tool call patterns where a rejection is followed by an immediate resubmission from the same client session.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-10-23T21:49:02Z","date_published":"2026-10-23T21:49:02Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-obsidian-tc-hitl-bypass/","summary":"A vulnerability in the obsidian-tc server allows malicious or non-compliant clients to execute destructive tool calls by echoing validly bound request states even after a human-in-the-loop confirmation is declined.","title":"Obsidian obsidian-tc: HITL confirmation bypass in tool execution (CVE-2026-115477)","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-obsidian-tc-hitl-bypass/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Obsidian-Tc","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}