Object-Storage — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/object-storage/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioTue, 14 Apr 2026 00:05:52 +0000MinIO Unauthenticated Object Write Vulnerabilityhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-minio-auth-bypass/Tue, 14 Apr 2026 00:05:52 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-minio-auth-bypass/Two authentication bypass vulnerabilities in MinIO allow writing arbitrary objects to any bucket with only a valid access key, without the secret key or valid signature, impacting all MinIO deployments.MinIO is susceptible to two authentication bypass vulnerabilities affecting all deployments up to AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z. The vulnerability lies within the STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER code path. An attacker possessing a valid access key (including the default minioadmin or any key with WRITE permissions) can exploit these flaws to write arbitrary objects to any bucket. This bypass eliminates the need for the secret key or a valid cryptographic signature. One vulnerability involves missing signature verification in PutObjectExtractHandler, while the other bypasses signature verification using query-string credentials. These issues stem from the introduction of authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer support in commit 76913a9fd, specifically impacting releases from RELEASE.2023-05-18T00-05-36Z onwards.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker obtains a valid MinIO access key, either through default credentials or compromised accounts.
  2. For vulnerability 1, the attacker crafts a PUT request with X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER, X-Amz-Meta-Snowball-Auto-Extract: true, and an Authorization header containing the valid access key but a fabricated signature.
  3. The request is sent to the MinIO server’s PutObjectExtractHandler endpoint.
  4. Due to the missing signature verification in the PutObjectExtractHandler, the request proceeds without proper authentication.
  5. The server extracts the access key and checks IAM permissions via isPutActionAllowed, but the fabricated signature is not validated.
  6. The server accepts the request, and the attacker-controlled payload is extracted into the target bucket.
  7. For vulnerability 2, the attacker crafts a PUT or PUT Part request omitting the Authorization header.
  8. The attacker includes authentication credentials (access key) exclusively via the X-Amz-Credential query parameter. Since the Authorization header is missing, signature verification is skipped, and the request proceeds with the permissions of the impersonated access key, allowing the attacker to write arbitrary objects.

Impact

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities allows unauthorized users to modify objects within MinIO storage buckets, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or the injection of malicious content. Any MinIO deployment is affected, creating a widespread risk for organizations relying on MinIO for their storage infrastructure. The CVSS v4.0 score of 8.8 (High) highlights the severity and potential impact of these vulnerabilities. The number of victims depends on the adoption rate of vulnerable MinIO versions.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade to MinIO AIStor version RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z or later, as indicated in the MinIO AIStor documentation.
  • Implement a block at the load balancer or reverse proxy to reject any requests containing X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER, as mentioned in the Workarounds section.
  • Deploy the Sigma rule Detect MinIO Unsigned Payload Trailer to identify exploitation attempts based on the presence of the vulnerable header.
  • Review and restrict WRITE permissions (s3:PutObject) to trusted principals to reduce the attack surface as described in the Workarounds section.
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