<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Memcached — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/memcached/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Thu, 21 May 2026 07:13:41 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/memcached/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>CVE-2026-47783: memcached Timing Side Channel Vulnerability in SASL Authentication</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-memcached-timing-vuln/</link><pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2026 07:13:41 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-memcached-timing-vuln/</guid><description>CVE-2026-47783 is a timing side channel vulnerability in memcached before 1.6.42, affecting SASL password database authentication due to premature loop exit upon finding a valid username, potentially leading to information disclosure.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>CVE-2026-47783 is a security vulnerability affecting memcached versions prior to 1.6.42. The vulnerability lies in the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) password database authentication mechanism. Specifically, the <code>sasl_server_userdb_checkpass</code> function prematurely exits a loop upon encountering a valid username. This behavior introduces a timing side channel, where the time taken to process an authentication request can reveal information about the existence of usernames in the database. An attacker could exploit this timing difference to enumerate valid usernames. This vulnerability impacts systems where memcached is configured to use SASL authentication with a password database, and successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized information disclosure.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Attacker sends an authentication request with a potential username.</li>
<li>The <code>sasl_server_userdb_checkpass</code> function in memcached is invoked.</li>
<li>The function iterates through the list of valid usernames.</li>
<li>If a matching username is found, the loop exits immediately.</li>
<li>The time taken for the function to complete is measured by the attacker.</li>
<li>The attacker repeats the process with different usernames, observing the timing variations.</li>
<li>By analyzing the timing data, the attacker identifies usernames that cause a faster response.</li>
<li>The faster response indicates a valid username, allowing the attacker to enumerate valid usernames.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-47783 allows an attacker to enumerate valid usernames in the memcached SASL password database. While it does not directly expose passwords, knowing valid usernames significantly weakens the security posture. This information can then be used in subsequent brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks against the memcached instance or other services where the same usernames are used. The impact is heightened in environments where memcached stores sensitive data and is protected by SASL authentication.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade memcached to version 1.6.42 or later to patch CVE-2026-47783.</li>
<li>Monitor memcached logs for unusual authentication patterns or attempts to enumerate usernames. Deploy the Sigma rule <code>Detect Memcached SASL Authentication Username Enumeration</code> to detect potential exploitation attempts.</li>
<li>Consider implementing rate limiting on authentication attempts to mitigate brute-force attacks that could leverage enumerated usernames.</li>
<li>If possible, migrate away from SASL password database authentication to more secure authentication mechanisms like certificate-based authentication.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">medium</category><category domain="type">threat</category><category>timing side channel</category><category>information disclosure</category><category>memcached</category></item><item><title>OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation (OBI) Memcached Integer Overflow DoS</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-opentelemetry-integer-overflow/</link><pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 20:22:53 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-opentelemetry-integer-overflow/</guid><description>A remotely reachable integer overflow in OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation's (OBI) memcached text protocol parser can crash the OBI process, causing a denial of service due to unchecked arithmetic when handling large payload sizes in memcached storage commands.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the memcached text protocol parser within OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation (OBI). The vulnerability resides in the <code>pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go</code> file, where the parser lacks proper bounds checking when handling the <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> field of memcached storage commands (<code>set</code>, <code>add</code>, <code>replace</code>, <code>append</code>, <code>prepend</code>, <code>cas</code>). By sending a crafted memcached request with an extremely large <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> value (e.g., <code>math.MaxInt</code> or <code>math.MaxInt-1</code>), an attacker can cause an integer overflow during payload length calculation. This overflow results in a negative payload length being passed to <code>LargeBufferReader.Peek</code> in <code>pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go</code>, triggering a runtime panic and crashing the OBI process. This vulnerability affects OBI versions 0.7.0 to 0.8.x, allowing a remote attacker to disrupt telemetry collection.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Attacker identifies an OBI instance instrumenting memcached traffic.</li>
<li>Attacker crafts a memcached storage command (e.g., <code>set</code>) with a large <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> field (close to <code>math.MaxInt</code>).</li>
<li>Attacker sends the crafted memcached storage command to a service instrumented by the vulnerable OBI instance on port 11211.</li>
<li>OBI&rsquo;s memcached request parser (<code>memcachedCommandBytesField</code> in <code>pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go</code>) receives the crafted command and parses the <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> field using <code>strconv.Atoi</code>.</li>
<li>OBI calculates the payload length by adding the <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> value to the length of the trailing <code>\r\n</code> delimiter.</li>
<li>Due to the large <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> value, the addition overflows, resulting in a negative <code>payloadLen</code>.</li>
<li>The negative <code>payloadLen</code> is passed to <code>LargeBufferReader.Peek</code> in <code>pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go</code>.</li>
<li><code>LargeBufferReader.Peek</code> attempts to slice a buffer with the negative length, causing a Go runtime panic and crashing the OBI process.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in a denial of service (DoS) against the OBI process. This leads to a loss of telemetry data collection for any services being monitored by the affected OBI instance. The attacker only needs to send a crafted memcached storage command to a service that OBI is instrumenting. This vulnerability impacts OBI deployments where the memcached parser is active and the instrumented services are reachable or influenceable by an attacker.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Deploy the Sigma rule <code>Detect OpenTelemetry OBI Memcached Integer Overflow Attempt</code> to detect crafted memcached storage commands with extremely large <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> values in network traffic.</li>
<li>Monitor OBI process logs and container status for crashes originating from <code>LargeBufferReader.Peek</code>, as indicated in the overview, to identify potential exploitation attempts.</li>
<li>Consider filtering or sanitizing memcached storage command inputs to prevent excessively large <code>&lt;bytes&gt;</code> values from reaching instrumented services.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">medium</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>denial-of-service</category><category>integer-overflow</category><category>memcached</category><category>opentelemetry</category></item></channel></rss>