Lupa - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/lupa/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioTue, 09 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000Lupa Sandbox Escape via Incomplete attribute_filter Enforcementhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-lupa-sandbox-escape/Tue, 09 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-lupa-sandbox-escape/The lupa library's attribute_filter is not consistently applied when attributes are accessed through built-in functions like getattr and setattr, leading to a sandbox escape and arbitrary code execution.The lupa library, version 2.6 and earlier, contains a vulnerability in its attribute_filter implementation. This filter aims to restrict access to sensitive Python attributes when exposing objects to Lua code. However, the filter is inconsistently applied, specifically when attributes are accessed through built-in functions like getattr and setattr. This inconsistency allows an attacker with the ability to execute Lua code to bypass the intended restrictions, ultimately leading to arbitrary code execution on the host system. This vulnerability impacts applications that rely on attribute_filter as a security control for untrusted Lua code execution, particularly if they allow access to Python builtins.

Attack Chain

  1. The attacker gains the ability to execute arbitrary Lua code within an application that uses the lupa library.
  2. The Lua code gains access to a Python object exposed through lupa.
  3. The Lua code utilizes the python.builtins.getattr function to access the __class__ attribute of the exposed Python object, bypassing the attribute_filter.
  4. The Lua code uses getattr again to access the __mro__ attribute of the class, walking up the inheritance chain.
  5. The Lua code calls the __subclasses__() method (accessed via getattr) to enumerate all subclasses of the base object class.
  6. The Lua code iterates through the subclasses, searching for a class containing os._wrap_close.
  7. The Lua code uses getattr to access the __init__ attribute of the identified subclass, and then accesses its __globals__ attribute to retrieve the os.system function.
  8. Finally, the Lua code uses setattr to assign the os.system function to an attribute of the original Python object and executes arbitrary commands on the host system, achieving sandbox escape.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass the attribute_filter in the lupa library. This leads to arbitrary code execution within the host Python process. The impact is a full sandbox escape, potentially allowing the attacker to compromise the entire system. Any application using lupa to execute untrusted Lua code is vulnerable if it relies solely on attribute_filter and doesn't disable access to Python builtins. This affects applications using lupa version 2.6 or earlier.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade to a patched version of the lupa library that addresses this vulnerability.
  • If upgrading is not immediately feasible, disable access to Python builtins via the register_builtins=False option when creating a LuaRuntime instance.
  • Monitor process creation events for suspicious processes spawned by the Python interpreter, as a sign of successful exploitation (see Sigma rule Detect Suspicious Process Creation from Python).
  • Implement additional security controls, such as seccomp profiles, to limit the capabilities of the Python process.
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