{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/logic-vulnerability/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":7.5,"id":"CVE-2026-68500"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Sylius Mollie Plugin"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["web-application","e-commerce","cve-2026-68500","logic-vulnerability"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Sylius"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe Sylius Mollie Plugin contains a critical logic flaw (CVE-2026-68500) in the payment webhook controller that allows unauthenticated attackers to forge payment status updates. The vulnerability exists in the \u003ccode\u003esylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook\u003c/code\u003e endpoint (\u003ccode\u003e/{_locale}/update-payment\u003c/code\u003e). This endpoint accepts an \u003ccode\u003eid\u003c/code\u003e parameter (Mollie payment ID) and an \u003ccode\u003eorderId\u003c/code\u003e parameter without validating that the provided payment ID actually belongs to the specified order.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn attacker can exploit this by obtaining a valid, successful Mollie payment ID from their own transaction (e.g., a minimal value purchase) and submitting it to the webhook along with the sequential ID of a victim's pending order. The application incorrectly marks the victim's order as paid, enabling unauthorized fulfillment without corresponding financial settlement. Given that Sylius order IDs are typically sequential, this flaw allows for mass exploitation and financial impact on merchants. The vulnerability affects plugin versions prior to 2.2.8, 3.2.4, and 3.3.1.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker performs a legitimate purchase on the target e-commerce site to obtain a valid, successful \u003ccode\u003eid\u003c/code\u003e (Mollie payment reference).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker identifies a sequence of target \u003ccode\u003eorderId\u003c/code\u003e values (e.g., sequential integers) for pending orders in the store.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker crafts an HTTP POST request to the endpoint \u003ccode\u003e/{_locale}/update-payment\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker inserts the legitimate Mollie payment \u003ccode\u003eid\u003c/code\u003e obtained in step 1 into the \u003ccode\u003eid\u003c/code\u003e request parameter.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker iterates through the target \u003ccode\u003eorderId\u003c/code\u003e values in the \u003ccode\u003eorderId\u003c/code\u003e request parameter.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe backend processes the malicious webhook, fails to correlate the payment to the order, and updates the payment status to \u0026quot;completed\u0026quot; in the database.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker receives an HTTP 200 response from the server, indicating successful processing.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe merchant's order management system marks the victim's order as paid, triggering unauthorized inventory fulfillment or service delivery.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation results in significant financial loss for merchants, as attackers can bypass payment verification to obtain goods or services for free. Because the endpoint lacks authentication, CSRF protections, or rate limiting, an attacker can programmatically iterate through large numbers of orders, causing widespread fraudulent state changes across the entire store's transaction database.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade the \u003ccode\u003ecomposer/sylius/mollie-plugin\u003c/code\u003e to versions 2.2.8, 3.2.4, or 3.3.1 immediately to incorporate the mandatory binding verification between Mollie IDs and order records.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf immediate patching is not possible, implement the provided decorator pattern in \u003ccode\u003esrc/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php\u003c/code\u003e to perform pre-validation of the \u003ccode\u003eorderId\u003c/code\u003e against the stored \u003ccode\u003epayment_mollie_id\u003c/code\u003e before the native controller processes the request.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor web server logs for high-frequency POST requests to the \u003ccode\u003e/{_locale}/update-payment\u003c/code\u003e endpoint originating from single IP addresses, which may indicate automated status forgery attempts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnsure that the web server configuration for this path includes strict rate limiting to mitigate the risk of mass automated order status modification.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-07-31T19:29:42Z","date_published":"2026-07-31T19:29:42Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-mollie-forgery/","summary":"The Sylius Mollie Plugin is susceptible to an unauthenticated payment status forgery via the webhook handler, allowing attackers to mark arbitrary orders as paid by reusing valid payment IDs.","title":"Sylius Mollie Plugin Payment Status Forgery Vulnerability","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-mollie-forgery/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Logic-Vulnerability","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}