<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Lockbit - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/lockbit/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:31:26 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/lockbit/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>VMware ESXi: Unauthorized local account creation detection</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-esxi-account-persistence/</link><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:31:26 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-esxi-account-persistence/</guid><description>This brief details the detection of local account creation on VMware ESXi hosts, a technique frequently used by threat actors to establish persistence on hypervisors.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Local account creation on VMware ESXi hosts serves as a persistence mechanism that survives session termination. Unauthorized accounts, often created via the Host Client or <code>esxcli</code> system commands, are a known precursor to hypervisor-level control, particularly in ransomware campaigns. Organizations should audit account creation events against expected administrative activity.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Unauthorized local accounts provide persistent access to the ESXi hypervisor, enabling potential lateral movement, data exfiltration, or deployment of ransomware by threat actors who have gained initial management access.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Deploy log collection for VMware ESXi using the Elastic vSphere integration to ensure visibility into <code>hostd</code> and shell execution logs.</li>
<li>Establish a baseline of authorized administrative accounts for all ESXi hosts.</li>
<li>Monitor for the creation of local accounts (<code>esxcli system account add</code>) or logs indicating an account was created on a host.</li>
<li>Investigate any account creation not tied to documented onboarding or break-glass procedures by identifying the user who performed the action and checking for subsequent assignment of administrative roles.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">threat</category><category>persistence</category><category>ransomware</category><category>vmware</category><category>extortion</category><category>lockbit</category><category>esxi</category></item></channel></rss>