Lateral_movement — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/lateral_movement/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000Suspicious AWS EC2 Key Pair Creation from Non-Cloud AShttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-ec2-keypair-creation/Wed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-ec2-keypair-creation/An AWS EC2 CreateKeyPair event triggered by a new principal originating from a network autonomous system (AS) organization not associated with major cloud providers, indicating potential unauthorized access or persistence activity.This alert identifies suspicious activity related to the creation of EC2 key pairs within an AWS environment. Specifically, it focuses on instances where a new IAM principal (user) creates an EC2 key pair from a network source (IP address) whose autonomous system organization is not commonly associated with major cloud providers like Amazon, Google, or Microsoft. Adversaries often create key pairs for persistence or to enable unauthorized access to EC2 instances, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further malicious activities. The rule uses a new terms approach to baseline user activity, reducing noise from repeated actions while still flagging the initial suspicious key pair creation. This activity is flagged as suspicious due to originating from outside trusted ASNs.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker gains initial access to an AWS account, potentially through compromised credentials or a misconfigured IAM role.
  2. The attacker attempts to enumerate existing EC2 instances and associated key pairs.
  3. The attacker uses the CreateKeyPair API call to generate a new SSH key pair within the AWS account. The request originates from a network with an autonomous system organization not attributed to common cloud providers.
  4. The attacker stores the private key material for later use in accessing EC2 instances.
  5. The attacker may then use the new key pair to launch new EC2 instances or import the key to existing instances. This can be done through RunInstances or ImportKeyPair operations.
  6. The attacker uses the new key pair to SSH into the newly created or compromised EC2 instances.
  7. Once inside the instances, the attacker performs malicious activities, such as data exfiltration, lateral movement, or installing malware.

Impact

Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to EC2 instances, potentially compromising sensitive data and disrupting services. A compromised AWS account can allow the attacker to steal data, establish persistence, and move laterally within the cloud environment. The lack of expected cloud provider ASN for the source IP of the CreateKeyPair event raises the risk profile.

Recommendation

  • Deploy the Sigma rule “AWS EC2 CreateKeyPair from Non-Cloud AS Organization” to your SIEM and tune the source.as.organization.name exclusions based on your environment.
  • Review AWS CloudTrail logs for any CreateKeyPair events and correlate with other suspicious activity, as mentioned in the investigation steps in this brief.
  • Implement stricter IAM policies to limit the ability to create key pairs to only authorized users and roles.
  • Monitor for RunInstances or ImportKeyPair events using the newly created key names as identified from aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters / response_elements.
  • Enable and review AWS Config rules to detect and remediate misconfigurations related to IAM and EC2 key pair management.
]]>mediumadvisoryawsec2keypairpersistencecredential_accesslateral_movementSuspicious PowerShell Reconnaissance via WMI Querieshttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-wmi-reconnaissance/Tue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-wmi-reconnaissance/Detection of suspicious PowerShell activity using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to gather system information, indicative of reconnaissance efforts by adversaries potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement.This brief focuses on detecting reconnaissance activities performed through PowerShell using WMI queries. Adversaries often use WMI to gather detailed information about a compromised system, including hardware specifications, operating system details, and installed software. This information can be used to plan further attacks, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific WMI queries that target system information classes like Win32_Bios, Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor and others. Identifying this behavior early can help defenders disrupt attack chains before significant damage occurs. The analytic is based on the detection logic from the Splunk Security Content project as of April 2026.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker gains initial access to the target system, potentially through phishing or exploiting a software vulnerability.
  2. The attacker executes a PowerShell script, either directly or via a command-line interpreter like cmd.exe.
  3. The PowerShell script uses the Get-WmiObject cmdlet or a direct WMI query with SELECT to query system information.
  4. Specific WMI classes are targeted, including Win32_Bios, Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor, Win32_ComputerSystem, Win32_PnPEntity, Win32_ShadowCopy, Win32_DiskDrive, Win32_PhysicalMemory, Win32_BaseBoard, and Win32_DisplayConfiguration.
  5. The script collects the data returned by the WMI queries.
  6. The gathered information is used to profile the system and identify potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses.
  7. The attacker uses the gathered information to plan subsequent stages of the attack, like lateral movement or privilege escalation.
  8. The attacker executes further commands based on the gathered information.

Impact

Successful reconnaissance can provide attackers with a comprehensive understanding of the target environment, enabling them to tailor their attacks for maximum impact. This can lead to successful privilege escalation, lateral movement, data exfiltration, or ransomware deployment. Organizations that fail to detect and prevent reconnaissance activities are at a higher risk of experiencing significant data breaches and financial losses. The Maze ransomware group, Industroyer2, and LockBit ransomware have been observed using similar reconnaissance techniques.

Recommendation

  • Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on all endpoints to capture the necessary data for detection (PowerShell Script Block Logging 4104).
  • Deploy the Sigma rule Detect Suspicious WMI Reconnaissance via PowerShell to identify PowerShell scripts querying sensitive WMI classes.
  • Investigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule, focusing on the user and process context to determine potential malicious intent.
  • Review and tune the Recon Using WMI Class detection filter (recon_using_wmi_class_filter) to reduce false positives in your environment.
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