Attack Chain

1. Initial Access / Reconnaissance: An unauthenticated attacker identifies a praisonai-platform instance, possibly by interacting with its API endpoints or discovering the underlying software version.
2. Vulnerability Identification: The attacker identifies that the application is running praisonai-platform version 0.1.4 or earlier and has not correctly configured its PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET and PLATFORM_ENV environment variables, leading to the use of the default dev-secret-change-me JWT secret.
3. Token Forgery: Using the publicly known JWT secret (dev-secret-change-me) and the HS256 algorithm, the attacker crafts a JWT with arbitrary claims, including sub (user ID) and email, for a target user (e.g., an administrative user like admin@example.com or a known user ID).
4. Authentication Bypass: The attacker sends the forged JWT in an Authorization header to a protected endpoint (e.g., /api/v1/workspaces, /api/v1/projects).
5. User Impersonation: The praisonai-platform server validates the forged token using the default secret and treats the attacker as the impersonated user (e.g., admin-user-id-attacker-chose).
6. Privilege Escalation / Unauthorized Access: If the forged token impersonates an administrator or a member of a specific workspace, the attacker gains full access to that user's resources and permissions within the application, including creating, modifying, or deleting data.
7. Impact: The attacker proceeds to exfiltrate data, tamper with application settings, or perform other malicious actions as the impersonated user.

Impact

This critical vulnerability directly leads to complete authentication bypass and privilege escalation within affected praisonai-platform deployments. An attacker can impersonate any user, including administrators, by forging JWTs with arbitrary user IDs and email addresses. All routes protected by the get_current_user dependency, which includes core functionalities such as managing workspaces, projects, issues, agents, and labels, become vulnerable to unauthorized access. The consequence is full compromise of the application's data and functionality, with potential for sensitive data exfiltration, system configuration changes, and disruption of service. There is no specific victim count, but any instance of praisonai-platform running the vulnerable versions without proper environment configuration is at risk.

Recommendation

• Immediate Action: Patch praisonai-platform to a version that addresses this vulnerability or ensure PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET is set to a strong, random, and unique value (at least 32 bytes) in all environments, including development. Set PLATFORM_ENV to a non-dev value (e.g., production) for production deployments to ensure the built-in guard is active.
• Detection Engineering: Deploy the provided Sigma rule "Detect PraisonAI Platform Vulnerable File (SHA256)" to identify instances running the vulnerable auth_service.py file.
• Supply Chain Security: Implement automated scanning for component vulnerabilities (SCA) to identify the presence of praisonai-platform <= 0.1.4 in your software supply chain.
• Log Configuration: Ensure application logs are configured to capture environment variable settings on process startup, if possible, to detect instances where PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET is unset or PLATFORM_ENV defaults to dev.