Attack Chain

1. The attacker sends an unauthenticated GET request to https://victim.example.com/plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php.
2. The AVideo server echoes the local $objClone->myKey within the HTTP response body due to a flawed error message construction.
3. The attacker extracts the leaked $objClone->myKey from the response.
4. The attacker crafts a malicious request to the remote CloneSite server (https://remote-server.example.com/plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php) using the leaked $objClone->myKey and the victim’s URL.
5. The remote CloneSite server validates the attacker’s request using the provided key, successfully authenticating the attacker as the victim client.
6. The remote server executes a mysqldump command, dumping the entire database (excluding CachesInDB) to a publicly accessible directory (videos/clones/).
7. The attacker retrieves the database dump from the remote server via an unauthenticated HTTP GET request to https://remote-server.example.com/videos/clones/Clone_mysqlDump_*.sql.
8. The attacker analyzes the database dump, gaining access to sensitive information such as user credentials, payment records, and API keys.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to retrieve the CloneSite shared secret (myKey) of any AVideo installation with the CloneSite plugin enabled. When the affected installation is federated with a remote CloneSite server, the attacker can impersonate the victim client and trigger a full database dump of the remote server containing sensitive data. This can lead to the compromise of user accounts, financial information, and sensitive plugin configurations on the remote server. This vulnerability permits unauthorized access to critical data, potentially resulting in severe data breaches and financial losses.

Recommendation

• Apply the recommended fix by not echoing the expected key in the rejection message within plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php, and reject non-CLI / non-admin callers cleanly, as detailed in the overview (see code snippet in advisory).
• Implement the additional hardening recommendations, including replacing the static myKey with a randomly generated, per-installation key stored in the plugin configuration that can be rotated.
• On the remote side (cloneServer.json.php), consider requiring the sqlFile path to be unguessable (already is, via uniqid()) AND gating the dump behind an IP allowlist or an additional pre-shared rotating token.
• Serve videos/clones/ with an .htaccess/nginx rule that denies direct HTTP access, so that even if a rogue client is authenticated, the dump is not downloadable over the web.