{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/indirect-execution/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Microsoft Defender XDR","SentinelOne Cloud Funnel","Elastic Defend"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["defense-evasion","indirect-execution","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","CrowdStrike","SentinelOne","Elastic"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe Windows \u003ccode\u003eforfiles\u003c/code\u003e utility is a legitimate command-line tool that allows batch processing of files. However, adversaries can abuse \u003ccode\u003eforfiles\u003c/code\u003e to execute arbitrary commands indirectly, bypassing security controls and evading detection. This technique, known as \u0026ldquo;Indirect Command Execution,\u0026rdquo; involves using \u003ccode\u003eforfiles\u003c/code\u003e to invoke other processes or run scripts, effectively hiding the malicious intent behind a trusted Windows utility. This method can be used to download payloads, execute scripts, or perform other malicious activities under the guise of legitimate \u003ccode\u003eforfiles\u003c/code\u003e activity. The attacks leveraging this technique have been observed since at least 2025. This matters for defenders because it allows attackers to blend in with normal system activity and makes it harder to identify malicious behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to the system through an unknown vector (e.g., phishing or exploiting a vulnerability).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages \u003ccode\u003eforfiles.exe\u003c/code\u003e to execute a command by using the \u003ccode\u003e/c\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003e-c\u003c/code\u003e argument.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker crafts the command to execute a script, download a file, or perform another malicious action.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003eforfiles.exe\u003c/code\u003e launches the specified command, which could involve PowerShell, cmd.exe, or another scripting engine.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe script executes, downloading a malicious payload from an external source.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe payload is saved to disk and executed, establishing persistence.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the compromised system to move laterally within the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe final objective is achieved, such as data exfiltration or ransomware deployment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation can lead to a compromised system, allowing attackers to perform various malicious activities, including data theft, malware installation, and lateral movement within the network. The impact is dependent on the attacker\u0026rsquo;s objectives and the level of access gained. By using \u003ccode\u003eforfiles\u003c/code\u003e, attackers can bypass traditional security measures and remain undetected for longer periods. The severity is medium as it requires initial access and relies on a dual-use tool.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eCommand Execution via ForFiles\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM to detect suspicious command execution patterns involving \u003ccode\u003eforfiles.exe\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor process creation events for instances of \u003ccode\u003eforfiles.exe\u003c/code\u003e with the \u003ccode\u003e/c\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003e-c\u003c/code\u003e arguments, excluding known legitimate uses as specified in the Sigma rule.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any instances of \u003ccode\u003eforfiles.exe\u003c/code\u003e execution where the command line contains suspicious parameters or attempts to execute scripts from unusual locations (e.g., the user\u0026rsquo;s temporary directory).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) to gain more detailed information about process executions, including command-line arguments and parent-child relationships.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and audit the usage of \u003ccode\u003eforfiles.exe\u003c/code\u003e across the environment to identify any unauthorized or suspicious activity.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-03-forfiles-indirect-exec/","summary":"Adversaries may use the Windows forfiles utility to proxy command execution via a trusted parent process, potentially evading detection.","title":"Command Execution via ForFiles Utility","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-03-forfiles-indirect-exec/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Indirect-Execution","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}