Tag
Expanding Detection Beyond Endpoints to Counter Evolving Threats
3 rules 6 TTPsThreat actors are rapidly exfiltrating data by exploiting blind spots created by an over-reliance on endpoint data, necessitating a comprehensive security approach that incorporates cloud, identity, and network telemetry for effective threat detection and response.
AWS IAM Privilege Operations via Lambda Execution Role
2 rules 3 TTPsDetection of IAM API calls that create or empower IAM users and roles, attach policies, or configure instance profiles when the caller is an assumed role session associated with AWS Lambda, potentially indicating privilege escalation or persistence.
AWS IAM Login Profile Added for Root
2 rules 2 TTPsAn adversary with temporary root access in AWS may create a login profile for the root account to establish persistent console access, even if the original access keys are rotated or disabled.
AWS IAM Long-Term Access Key Correlated with Elevated Detection Alerts
2 rules 2 TTPsThis rule correlates AWS Long-Term Access Key First Seen from Source IP alerts with other open alerts of medium or higher severity that share the same IAM access key ID to prioritize investigation of potentially compromised accounts, helping identify post-compromise activity.
AWS SAML Provider Deletion Activity
2 rules 2 TTPsAn adversary may delete an AWS SAML provider to disrupt administrative access, hindering incident response and potentially escalating privileges within the AWS environment.
S3Browser IAM Policy Creation with Default Bucket Name
2 rules 3 TTPsAn AWS IAM policy is created by the S3Browser utility with the default S3 bucket name placeholder, potentially indicating unauthorized access or misconfiguration.
AWS IAM User or Access Key Creation via S3 Browser
2 rules 2 TTPsThe use of S3 Browser to create IAM users or access keys in AWS environments indicates a potential privilege escalation, persistence, or initial access attempt by threat actors leveraging a known cloud administration tool.
AWS IAM Customer Managed Policy Version Manipulation for Privilege Escalation
2 rules 2 TTPsSuccessful creation of new or setting default versions of customer-managed IAM policies can indicate privilege escalation attempts by attackers modifying policy permissions.
AWS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from Kubernetes SA and External ASN
2 rules 1 TTPDetects successful AWS `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` calls where the caller identity is a Kubernetes service account and the source autonomous system organization is not `Amazon.com, Inc.`, which may indicate a stolen or misused projected service-account token being exchanged for IAM credentials off-cluster.
S3 Browser Used to Create IAM Login Profiles
2 rules 2 TTPsThe S3 Browser utility is being used to enumerate IAM users lacking login profiles and subsequently create them, potentially for reconnaissance, persistence, and privilege escalation within AWS environments.