Github Actions

A critical repository takeover vulnerability (CVE-2024-58354) exists in the cal.com (calcom/cal.diy) GitHub Actions workflows, allowing an attacker to submit a malicious pull request that executes arbitrary commands with write permissions to the repository, leading to full compromise.

A critical credential exposure vulnerability (CVE-2026-59891) exists in `@sigstore/oci` versions prior to 0.7.1. The `getRegistryCredentials()` function, used to read credentials from `~/.docker/config.json`, employs a substring match instead of an exact host match when selecting credentials. This flaw allows credentials for a legitimate registry (e.g., `ghcr.io`) to be inadvertently transmitted to an attacker-controlled registry if its hostname is a substring of the legitimate one (e.g., `cr.io`). This impacts consumers of `@sigstore/oci` and related GitHub Actions (`actions/attest`, `actions/attest-build-provenance`, `actions/attest-sbom`) when pushing artifacts to untrusted or attacker-influenced destination registries, potentially leading to the leakage of long-lived registry tokens. The vulnerability is fixed in `@sigstore/oci@0.7.1` by enforcing exact host matching.

Threat actors compromised AsyncAPI npm packages by exploiting a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow, stealing a privileged bot token, and injecting obfuscated Miasma malware into multiple packages, which then executed at module-load time to establish persistence and command and control, bypassing standard npm installation mitigations.

The compliance-trestle application is vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal; the `-o/--output` argument in `trestle author jinja` allows writing files outside the intended workspace due to improper validation of path traversal characters, leading to potential CI/CD compromise or local code execution by overwriting sensitive files such as `.github/workflows/*.yml` or `.git/hooks/*`.

The 'Megalodon' supply chain attack compromised over 5,500 GitHub repositories by injecting malicious GitHub Actions workflows designed to steal credentials, CI secrets, keys, and tokens.

CoreShop is vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via insecure `pull_request_target` configuration, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the GitHub Actions runner by submitting a malicious pull request and potentially exfiltrate secrets or modify repository contents; tracked as CVE-2026-41249.

On 2026-05-11, multiple malicious versions of `@tanstack/*` packages were published to the npm registry due to a chained attack exploiting vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions; the attacker used a compromised GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding to publish credential-stealing malware that harvests credentials, exfiltrates data, and propagates the compromise by republishing other packages with the same injection, requiring users who installed affected versions to consider their environment compromised and rotate all credentials.

Gemini CLI is vulnerable to remote code execution via workspace trust and tool allowlisting bypasses, impacting headless mode and GitHub Actions workflows.

PraisonAI versions 4.5.139 and below are vulnerable to credential leakage due to the ArtiPACKED attack, where GitHub Actions workflows using actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false write the GITHUB_TOKEN into the .git/config file, leading to potential exposure in uploaded artifacts and subsequent supply chain compromise.

The trivy-action GitHub Action was compromised via git tag repointing, where 76 of 77 release tags were retroactively poisoned, leading to a multi-stage credential theft operation discovered following a spike in script execution detections on Linux runners.

The aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub Action was compromised via git tag repointing, injecting malicious code into the entrypoint.sh script to steal credentials from CI/CD pipelines before executing the legitimate Trivy scanner.

The trivy-action GitHub Action, a widely used vulnerability scanner in CI/CD pipelines, was compromised via git tag repointing to inject a multi-stage credential stealer, affecting 76 of 77 release tags.

A vulnerability in versions prior to 0.2.86 of the act project allows remote attackers to create arbitrary caches, potentially leading to remote code execution within Docker containers by poisoning predicted cache keys.

The aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub Action was compromised via git tag repointing, injecting a multi-stage credential stealer into CI/CD pipelines, allowing for the theft of secrets and credentials.

The trivy-action GitHub Action was compromised via git tag repointing, with attackers poisoning 76 of 77 release tags to inject a multi-stage credential stealer before the legitimate scanner runs, granting attackers access to CI/CD pipeline secrets.

Unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in Langflow GitHub Actions workflows prior to version 1.9.0, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands via malicious branch names or pull request titles due to unsanitized GitHub context variable interpolation, leading to potential secret exfiltration and supply chain compromise.

TeamPCP conducted a supply chain attack compromising the KICS GitHub Action, impacting users who integrated the compromised version into their CI/CD pipelines.

Attackers hijacked 75 tags associated with the Trivy Security Scanner GitHub Actions to steal CI/CD secrets from users of the compromised tags.

The configuration of a GitHub Actions self-hosted runner using the Runner.Listener binary can indicate malicious activity aimed at establishing remote code execution via malicious GitHub workflows.

Compromised GitHub Actions workflows allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on self-hosted runners, leading to code execution, file manipulation, and potential data exfiltration.

A GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from `issue_comment.body` directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner.

OWASP BLT versions before 2.1.1 are vulnerable to remote code execution via a malicious pull request that injects code into the CI environment through the 'regenerate-migrations' workflow.

Adversaries compromising GitHub Actions workflows can execute arbitrary commands on runner hosts, leading to code execution, reconnaissance, credential harvesting, or network exfiltration.