Git-Hooks — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/git-hooks/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioTue, 23 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000GitPython Vulnerability Allows Arbitrary Code Execution via Git Hookshttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-23-gitpython-hook-execution/Tue, 23 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-23-gitpython-hook-execution/A vulnerability in GitPython versions prior to 3.1.47 allows for command execution during repository cloning by manipulating the `multi_options` parameter to inject malicious Git configurations, such as `core.hooksPath`, leading to the execution of attacker-controlled hooks.GitPython before version 3.1.47 is susceptible to a command execution vulnerability. The issue stems from how the _clone() function validates the multi_options parameter used in the clone_from(), clone(), or Submodule.update() methods. Specifically, the validation occurs on the original list of options before the shlex.split transformation. This allows an attacker to craft a string like "--branch main --config core.hooksPath=/x" which passes the initial validation because it starts with a safe option (--branch). However, after the string is split into tokens, the --config option becomes active, allowing the attacker to inject a malicious core.hooksPath configuration. This configuration points Git to a directory containing attacker-controlled Git hooks, which are then executed during the clone operation. This vulnerability is similar in nature to CVE-2023-40267.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker identifies a vulnerable application using GitPython to clone repositories.
  2. The attacker crafts a malicious string containing a Git configuration option, such as --config core.hooksPath=/path/to/malicious/hooks, embedded within a seemingly benign option string like --branch main --config core.hooksPath=/path/to/malicious/hooks.
  3. The attacker injects this malicious string into the multi_options parameter of the clone_from(), clone(), or Submodule.update() methods.
  4. GitPython’s _clone() function validates the multi_options parameter using Git.check_unsafe_options() before it is processed by shlex.split().
  5. Because the malicious string starts with a safe option (--branch), it bypasses the validation check.
  6. The shlex.split() function then transforms the string into a list of individual options, making the --config option active.
  7. The git clone command is executed with the injected --config core.hooksPath=/path/to/malicious/hooks option, causing Git to use the attacker-controlled directory for Git hooks.
  8. Git executes the malicious hooks (e.g., post-checkout), resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim’s machine.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system where the GitPython library is used. Any application that passes user-supplied input to the multi_options parameter of the affected functions is vulnerable. This can lead to complete system compromise, data exfiltration, or denial of service. The vulnerability affects GitPython versions prior to 3.1.47.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade GitPython to version 3.1.47 or later to patch the vulnerability (Affected Packages).
  • Implement input validation and sanitization for any user-supplied input used to construct the multi_options parameter to prevent injection of malicious Git configurations (Code).
  • Monitor process creation events for the execution of unexpected processes from directories specified as core.hooksPath (see Sigma rule Detect Suspicious Git Hook Execution).
  • Deploy the Sigma rules in this brief to your SIEM and tune for your environment.
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