Evomap — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/evomap/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 06 May 2026 12:00:00 +0000@evomap/evolver Path Traversal Vulnerability Leads to RCEhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-evomap-path-traversal/Wed, 06 May 2026 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-evomap-path-traversal/A path traversal vulnerability in `@evomap/evolver` allows a malicious A2A Hub to overwrite project files, leading to remote code execution when a user fetches a malicious skill.The @evomap/evolver package, specifically versions 1.70.0-beta.4 and earlier, contains a path traversal vulnerability in the evolver fetch subcommand. This vulnerability resides within index.js and allows a malicious A2A Hub to overwrite project files, ultimately leading to remote code execution (RCE). The flaw stems from insufficient sanitization of the skill_id parameter, where a regex allow-list permits the use of . characters. An attacker can exploit this by uploading a malicious skill to the A2A Hub with a crafted skill_id of .. and a bundled file such as index.js containing attacker-controlled JavaScript code. When a victim fetches the malicious skill, their index.js file is overwritten. The next time the victim invokes node index.js, even with a simple command like --help, the malicious code executes with the victim’s privileges, giving the attacker control of the victim’s environment.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker uploads a malicious skill to the A2A Hub, setting the skill_id to ... The malicious skill also includes a bundled_files array containing a file named index.js with malicious JavaScript code.
  2. The victim runs node index.js fetch --skill=anything to download the skill.
  3. The evolver fetch command in index.js uses path.join('.', 'skills', safeId) to determine the output directory, where safeId is the attacker-controlled skill_id after regex sanitization. Since safeId is .., the output directory resolves to the current working directory.
  4. The code proceeds to iterate over the bundled_files array from the Hub response and writes each file to the output directory.
  5. Due to the path traversal, the attacker-supplied index.js file overwrites the original index.js file in the victim’s current working directory.
  6. The victim subsequently invokes node index.js <command>, which executes the attacker-controlled JavaScript code due to the overwritten index.js file.
  7. The attacker achieves remote code execution with the privileges of the victim’s user account.
  8. The attacker can maintain persistence by using the run --loop daemon mode and injecting commands or establishing reverse shells.

Impact

Successful exploitation leads to remote code execution on the victim’s machine with the privileges of the evolver process. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands, install malware, steal sensitive data, or compromise the entire system. The impact is amplified because the loop daemon (node index.js run --loop) is the documented long-running mode, resulting in the malicious code being executed rapidly after the next daemon iteration. This vulnerability allows an attacker to compromise every user that fetches the malicious skill with a single malicious skill upload. Furthermore, the attacker can also overwrite other files like package.json, potentially leading to further compromise of the victim’s system.

Recommendation

  • Deploy the following Sigma rule to detect attempts to download skills with suspicious skill_id values from the A2A Hub.
  • Apply the provided patch to index.js to reject safeId values that are not single non-traversing path segments, or reuse the same path.relative check used in the --out branch.
  • Consider removing . from the regex allow-list used to sanitize the skill_id parameter.
  • Implement signature verification on the Hub response payload before writing any file to disk.
  • Disallow bundled-file safeName values that match top-level project files (index.js, package.json, package-lock.json, etc.) regardless of outDir.
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