{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/email_collection/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Outlook"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["email_collection","com_abuse","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eAttackers may exploit the Component Object Model (COM) interface in Microsoft Outlook to automate tasks such as sending emails or exfiltrating sensitive information. This attack involves leveraging unusual processes to interact with Outlook, potentially bypassing security measures. The activity is detected by monitoring for unexpected processes initiating communication with Outlook, especially those lacking trusted signatures or recently modified, indicating potential malicious activity. The detection focuses on identifying processes like rundll32.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe, and wscript.exe interacting with Outlook. This activity can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive email data or the ability to send malicious emails from compromised accounts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to a Windows system, often through phishing or exploiting a vulnerability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses a scripting language or executable, such as PowerShell or cmd.exe, to interact with the Outlook application via its COM interface.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe script attempts to enumerate mailboxes and email messages.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSensitive data from the email messages is collected and prepared for exfiltration.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe script initiates a network connection to a remote server controlled by the attacker.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe collected data is then exfiltrated to the attacker\u0026rsquo;s server.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAlternatively, the attacker crafts and sends emails from the compromised Outlook account to further propagate malware or conduct phishing campaigns.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker cleans up any traces of the malicious script or executables to maintain persistence.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation could lead to the compromise of sensitive information contained within user email accounts. This includes confidential business communications, personal data, and potentially credentials. The impact extends to potential data breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage. The number of affected users and the extent of the damage depends on the attacker\u0026rsquo;s objectives and the level of access achieved within the compromised email environment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor process execution for unusual processes (rundll32.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, cmd.exe, regsvr32.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe) spawning or interacting with OUTLOOK.EXE. Deploy the \u0026ldquo;Suspicious Outlook COM abuse by Scripting Host\u0026rdquo; Sigma rule to your SIEM and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement code signature validation for all executables in your environment. This will help identify and block unsigned or untrusted executables.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor for any network activity associated with the identified unusual processes. This helps to identify potential data exfiltration attempts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable process creation logging with command line arguments to enhance visibility into potential malicious activities. This is critical for the Sigma rules to function correctly.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRegularly review and update your endpoint protection policies to ensure that similar threats are detected and blocked.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the \u0026ldquo;Suspicious Outlook COM abuse by New Process\u0026rdquo; Sigma rule, correlating with user activity and network connections.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-02T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-02T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-outlook-com-abuse/","summary":"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information or send email on their behalf via API by abusing Outlook's Component Object Model (COM) interface from unusual processes.","title":"Suspicious Inter-Process Communication via Outlook COM","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-outlook-com-abuse/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Email_collection","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}