Dom — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/dom/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000xmldom XML Injection Vulnerabilityhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-xmldom-xml-injection/Wed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-xmldom-xml-injection/The xmldom package is vulnerable to XML injection. The package serializes DocumentType node fields (internalSubset, publicId, systemId) verbatim without any escaping or validation. When these fields are set programmatically to attacker-controlled strings, XMLSerializer.serializeToString can produce output where the DOCTYPE declaration is terminated early and arbitrary markup appears outside it. To address this applications that pass untrusted data to createDocumentType() or write untrusted values directly to a DocumentType node's publicId, systemId, or internalSubset properties should audit all serializeToString() call sites and add the option.The @xmldom/xmldom and xmldom packages are vulnerable to XML injection due to the lack of validation when serializing DocumentType node fields. Specifically, the internalSubset, publicId, and systemId fields are serialized verbatim without any escaping or validation. This vulnerability affects @xmldom/xmldom versions prior to 0.8.13 and versions 0.9.0 to 0.9.9, as well as xmldom versions up to 0.6.0. The vulnerability is triggered when these fields are programmatically set to attacker-controlled strings, leading to potential arbitrary markup injection outside the DOCTYPE declaration during serialization using XMLSerializer.serializeToString. This can lead to downstream XML parsers being susceptible to XXE attacks. Defenders should audit serializeToString() call sites and add { requireWellFormed: true } to mitigate this vulnerability.

Attack Chain

  1. The attacker identifies an application using a vulnerable version of @xmldom/xmldom or xmldom.
  2. The attacker finds a code path where they can control the publicId, systemId, or internalSubset properties of a DocumentType node.
  3. The attacker crafts a malicious string containing XML injection payloads (e.g., closing DOCTYPE tags or injecting SYSTEM entities).
  4. The attacker uses programmatic calls to createDocumentType or direct property writes to set the malicious string as the value of the publicId, systemId, or internalSubset field.
  5. The application calls XMLSerializer.serializeToString on the document, without the { requireWellFormed: true } option.
  6. The vulnerable serializer emits a DOCTYPE declaration where the injected malicious string is included verbatim, causing the DOCTYPE declaration to be terminated early or to include injected entities.
  7. The serialized XML is passed to a downstream XML parser that performs entity expansion.
  8. The downstream XML parser expands the injected entities, leading to potential XXE attacks, information disclosure, or other malicious actions.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the injection of arbitrary XML markup, potentially enabling XXE attacks against downstream XML parsers. The impact includes potential information disclosure, arbitrary code execution, or denial-of-service if the downstream parser expands external entities. This vulnerability impacts applications using vulnerable versions of @xmldom/xmldom and xmldom that construct DocumentType nodes from user-controlled data and serialize the document without proper validation.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade to @xmldom/xmldom version 0.8.13 or later, or version 0.9.10 or later, to receive the fix.
  • Upgrade to a version of xmldom greater than 0.6.0.
  • Audit all calls to XMLSerializer.serializeToString() and add the option { requireWellFormed: true } to enforce validation of DocumentType node fields, as described in the advisory.
  • Applications that pass untrusted data to createDocumentType() or write untrusted values directly to a DocumentType node’s publicId, systemId, or internalSubset properties should audit all serializeToString() call sites and add the option.
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