Datadestruction - CraftedSignal Threat Feed

AWS RDS DB Instance or Cluster Deletion Protection Disabled

hello@craftedsignal.io — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 14:30:00 +0000

This alert identifies instances where the deletionProtection feature of an AWS RDS DB instance or cluster is disabled. Deletion protection is a security mechanism that prevents accidental or unauthorized deletion of RDS resources. An adversary with sufficient permissions within a compromised AWS environment may disable this protection to pave the way for destructive activities, including the deletion of databases that hold sensitive or business-critical information. The detection focuses on explicit modifications setting deletionProtection to false on RDS DB instances or clusters. This activity is often a precursor to a DeleteDBInstance or DeleteDBCluster action.

Attack Chain

The adversary gains access to an AWS account with sufficient privileges to modify RDS instances or clusters, potentially through compromised credentials or an insider threat.
The attacker authenticates to the AWS Management Console, CLI, or API using the compromised credentials or assumed role.
The attacker uses the ModifyDBInstance or ModifyDBCluster API call to target a specific RDS DB instance or cluster.
Within the ModifyDBInstance or ModifyDBCluster API call, the attacker sets the deletionProtection parameter to false.
AWS CloudTrail logs the ModifyDBInstance or ModifyDBCluster event with deletionProtection=false in the requestParameters.
The attacker may then initiate a DeleteDBInstance or DeleteDBCluster API call to remove the targeted RDS resource.
The database instance or cluster is deleted, resulting in data loss and potential disruption of services.

Impact

Disabling deletion protection on AWS RDS instances or clusters can lead to the unauthorized or accidental deletion of critical databases. Successful execution of this attack can result in significant data loss, business disruption, and potential financial repercussions. The impact can range from temporary service outages to permanent data loss, depending on the affected systems and backup policies.

Recommendation

Deploy the Sigma rule AWS RDS Deletion Protection Disabled via CloudTrail to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect when deletion protection is disabled (refer to the rule definition below).
Review aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn to determine the IAM principal that made the change, and validate whether this principal normally performs RDS lifecycle operations as outlined in the investigation guide.
Immediately re-enable deletion protection (deletionProtection=true) on the affected DB instance or cluster if the change was unauthorized, as described in the remediation steps in the overview.
Restrict who can modify ModifyDBInstance or ModifyDBCluster destructive settings, such as deletion protection, backup retention, and public accessibility.

AWS RDS Snapshot Deletion Detected

hello@craftedsignal.io — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 12:00:00 +0000

This rule detects the deletion of AWS RDS DB snapshots or configuration changes that effectively remove backup coverage for a DB instance. RDS snapshots contain full backups of database instances, and disabling automated backups by setting "backupRetentionPeriod=0" has a similar impact by preventing future restore points. A threat actor with sufficient AWS permissions may delete snapshots or disable backups to inhibit recovery, destroy forensic evidence, or prepare for follow-on destructive actions such as instance or cluster deletion. The rule focuses on successful snapshot deletions and backup disabling events within AWS RDS. The scope includes any AWS environment utilizing RDS for database services.

Attack Chain

The attacker gains access to an AWS account with sufficient permissions to manage RDS instances and snapshots, possibly through compromised credentials or an IAM role with excessive privileges.
The attacker enumerates available RDS DB instances and snapshots within the target AWS account using AWS CLI or API calls (e.g., DescribeDBSnapshots, DescribeDBInstances).
The attacker identifies target DB instances and their associated snapshots that are critical for recovery or contain valuable forensic data.
The attacker deletes RDS DB snapshots using the DeleteDBSnapshot API call, effectively removing restore points.
Alternatively, the attacker modifies the DB instance configuration using the ModifyDBInstance API call, setting backupRetentionPeriod to 0 to disable automated backups and prevent future restore points.
The attacker may then delete the RDS instance itself using DeleteDBInstance.
The attacker attempts to cover their tracks by deleting relevant CloudTrail logs or disabling CloudTrail logging.
The attacker's objective is to prevent restoration to a known-good state and destroy forensic evidence of attacker actions, potentially as part of a ransomware attack or data exfiltration attempt.

Impact

Successful deletion of RDS snapshots or disabling of backups can lead to significant data loss and prolonged downtime, making recovery from security incidents or operational failures difficult or impossible. This can impact business continuity, data integrity, and regulatory compliance. The precise impact depends on the criticality of the affected databases and the availability of alternative backup mechanisms. If successful, this can result in total data loss for the organization.

Recommendation

Deploy the provided Sigma rule to your SIEM to detect suspicious DeleteDBSnapshot, DeleteDBClusterSnapshot, or ModifyDBInstance events setting backupRetentionPeriod=0 in AWS CloudTrail logs.
Restrict IAM permissions for rds:DeleteDBSnapshot, rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot, and rds:ModifyDBInstance (especially backup and deletion-related parameters) to a small set of privileged roles, as described in the remediation steps.
Use AWS Config rules and/or Security Hub controls to detect instances with backupRetentionPeriod=0, as recommended in the hardening and preventive controls section.

AWS KMS Customer Managed Key Disabled or Scheduled for Deletion

hello@craftedsignal.io — Wed, 03 Jan 2024 15:00:00 +0000

AWS KMS keys are critical for encryption across various AWS services like S3, EBS, and RDS. Disabling or scheduling a KMS key for deletion disrupts encryption and decryption workflows, potentially rendering data unrecoverable. The Elastic detection rule published on 2026-04-10 identifies attempts to disable or schedule the deletion of an AWS customer-managed KMS Key. These actions are typically rare, privileged, and tightly controlled, making unexpected instances high-risk. Adversaries might target KMS keys to sabotage recovery, impede forensic analysis, or destroy evidence. Defenders should prioritize monitoring KMS key lifecycle changes due to their potential for significant impact on data availability and business operations.

Attack Chain

An attacker gains unauthorized access to an AWS account.
The attacker escalates privileges to obtain the necessary KMS permissions.
The attacker uses the AWS CLI or API to execute the DisableKey command, specifying the ARN of the target KMS key.
Alternatively, the attacker uses the AWS CLI or API to execute the ScheduleKeyDeletion command, specifying the ARN of the target KMS key and a pending window in days.
CloudTrail logs the DisableKey or ScheduleKeyDeletion event with a status of "success".
If DisableKey was used, dependent services immediately begin failing or experience decryption errors.
If ScheduleKeyDeletion was used, the key enters a pending deletion state for the specified number of days.
Upon deletion, all data encrypted with the key becomes unrecoverable, leading to data loss and disruption of services.

Impact

Disabling or deleting KMS keys can have severe consequences, potentially impacting numerous AWS services relying on the key for encryption, including S3, EBS, RDS, Secrets Manager, and Lambda. This can lead to data unavailability, service disruptions, and irreversible data loss. The scope of impact depends on the criticality of the data protected by the key and the number of services affected. Successful execution of this attack can impede incident response efforts and result in significant financial and reputational damage.

Recommendation

Deploy the "AWS KMS Customer Managed Key Disabled or Scheduled for Deletion" Sigma rule to detect unauthorized KMS key lifecycle changes (rule.name).
Monitor AWS CloudTrail logs for DisableKey and ScheduleKeyDeletion events to detect potentially malicious activity (index).
Restrict AWS KMS lifecycle permissions (kms:DisableKey, kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion) to a minimal set of privileged users and roles (references).
Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for administrators with KMS key management permissions to prevent unauthorized access (Security Best Practices reference).
Enable AWS Config rules for KMS key state monitoring to continuously assess the configuration of KMS keys and detect deviations from desired states (Security Best Practices reference).

AWS RDS DB Instance or Cluster Deleted

hello@craftedsignal.io — Wed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000

The deletion of Amazon RDS DB instances, Aurora clusters, or global database clusters can lead to permanent data loss and major service disruption. This activity is often carried out by adversaries who have gained sufficient permissions within an AWS environment. The motivation behind such actions can range from impeding recovery efforts following a ransomware attack, destroying critical evidence to hinder forensic investigations, or directly inflicting operational impact on the targeted environment. Defenders should be aware that these actions are irreversible without backups, making swift detection and validation essential to mitigate potential damage.

Attack Chain

An adversary gains initial access to the AWS environment, potentially through compromised credentials or an IAM role with excessive permissions.
The attacker enumerates existing RDS DB instances, Aurora clusters, or global database clusters within the target AWS account to identify valuable targets.
The attacker modifies the deletionProtection setting on the target RDS resource to false to allow deletion.
The attacker may disable or modify backup configurations to prevent recovery options, such as setting backupRetentionPeriod to 0.
The attacker executes the DeleteDBInstance, DeleteDBCluster, or DeleteGlobalCluster API call to initiate the deletion process.
If configured, the attacker may attempt to delete any final snapshots created during the deletion process to further hinder recovery.
The targeted RDS resource is permanently deleted, resulting in data loss and potential service disruption.
The attacker may attempt to cover their tracks by deleting relevant CloudTrail logs or modifying IAM policies.

Impact

The deletion of RDS DB instances or clusters can lead to significant data loss, disrupting critical business operations. Depending on the size and importance of the deleted resources, organizations may face substantial financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties. If backups are unavailable or have also been compromised, data recovery may be impossible, leading to long-term business disruption. The impact can affect organizations of any size that rely on AWS RDS for data storage and retrieval.

Recommendation

Deploy the Sigma rule AWS RDS DB Instance or Cluster Deleted to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect unauthorized RDS resource deletions.
Enable deletionProtection on all critical RDS instances and clusters to prevent accidental or malicious deletion.
Enforce MFA for IAM users with RDS privileges to reduce the risk of compromised credentials (reference the additional information links).
Monitor CloudTrail logs for changes to deletionProtection settings and backup retention policies.
Regularly review and audit IAM policies to ensure that users and roles have only the necessary permissions.
Implement a process for validating unexpected RDS resource deletions with the service owner or database administrator.
Enable Sysmon process-creation logging to correlate with CloudTrail logs in case CLI or SDK tools are used for deletion.