Cwe-918 — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/cwe-918/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioThu, 30 Apr 2026 18:12:54 +0000n8n-mcp SDK Embedder SSRF Vulnerability via IPv6 Bypasshttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-n8n-mcp-ssrf/Thu, 30 Apr 2026 18:12:54 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-n8n-mcp-ssrf/The n8n-mcp SDK embedder path is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF) due to the synchronous URL validator in `SSRFProtection.validateUrlSync()` not checking for IPv6 addresses, allowing attackers to access cloud metadata endpoints, RFC1918 private networks, or localhost services by supplying a crafted `n8nApiUrl`.The n8n-mcp library, when embedded as an SDK, contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The vulnerability lies in the SSRFProtection.validateUrlSync() function, specifically within the N8NDocumentationMCPServer constructor, getN8nApiClient(), and validateInstanceContext() methods. This synchronous validator lacks IPv6 checks, allowing IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g., http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]) to bypass existing protections against cloud metadata, localhost, and private IP ranges. An attacker who can control the n8nApiUrl parameter can exploit this flaw to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal or external services. This issue affects deployments embedding n8n-mcp as an SDK using N8NDocumentationMCPServer or N8NMCPEngine with user-supplied InstanceContext on versions v2.47.4 through v2.47.13. Version v2.47.14 and later contain the patch for this vulnerability.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker identifies a vulnerable n8n-mcp deployment embedding the SDK and using a user-supplied InstanceContext.
  2. The attacker crafts a malicious n8nApiUrl containing an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address, such as http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254].
  3. The attacker supplies the crafted n8nApiUrl to the vulnerable N8NDocumentationMCPServer constructor or getN8nApiClient() method.
  4. The validateInstanceContext() function calls SSRFProtection.validateUrlSync() to validate the URL.
  5. The validateUrlSync() function fails to properly validate the IPv4-mapped IPv6 address.
  6. The server issues an HTTP request to the attacker-specified target using the bypassed URL.
  7. The x-n8n-api-key header is forwarded to the attacker-controlled target.
  8. The response body from the target is returned to the attacker, allowing the attacker to gather sensitive information from internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this SSRF vulnerability allows an attacker to perform unauthorized actions, such as accessing sensitive information from cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), RFC1918 private networks, or localhost services. The attacker can also gain access to the n8nApiKey, which is forwarded in the x-n8n-api-key header, potentially leading to further compromise of the n8n instance. This vulnerability impacts deployments embedding n8n-mcp as an SDK between versions v2.47.4 and v2.47.13.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade n8n-mcp to version v2.47.14 or later to patch the vulnerability as described in the advisory.
  • Implement a network-level block on outbound traffic from the n8n-mcp process to RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local 169.254.0.0/16, and cloud metadata endpoints as a defense-in-depth measure.
  • Deploy the Sigma rule Detect N8N MCP SSRF Attempt via IPv6 Bypass to identify exploitation attempts by detecting outbound connections to internal IPs using IPv6 mapped IPv4 address.
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