CVE-2026-46625 — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/cve-2026-46625/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioThu, 21 May 2026 21:21:39 +0000js-cookie Prototype Pollution via __proto__ Attribute Injection (CVE-2026-46625)https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-js-cookie-prototype-pollution/Thu, 21 May 2026 21:21:39 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-js-cookie-prototype-pollution/The js-cookie library is vulnerable to prototype pollution via the `assign()` function when processing JSON-derived objects, enabling an attacker to inject arbitrary cookie attributes by manipulating the `__proto__` property, as demonstrated by CVE-2026-46625.The js-cookie library, versions 3.0.5 and earlier, contains a prototype pollution vulnerability (CVE-2026-46625) within its internal assign() function. This function copies properties from source objects to a target object using for...in loops and plain assignment. When processing a source object derived from JSON (e.g., via JSON.parse), the __proto__ member becomes an own enumerable property. The assign function iterates over this property and inadvertently triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter. This results in a per-instance prototype pollution where attacker-controlled keys are inherited by the merged attributes object, allowing modification of cookie attributes.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker crafts a JSON payload containing a __proto__ property with malicious cookie attributes (e.g., domain, secure, samesite, expires, path).
  2. The application fetches configuration data from a backend endpoint, parsing the JSON response using JSON.parse.
  3. The parsed JSON data, containing the attacker’s payload, is passed as the attributes argument to Cookies.set(), Cookies.remove(), Cookies.withAttributes(), or Cookies.withConverter().
  4. The assign() function within js-cookie iterates over the attacker-controlled __proto__ property in the source object.
  5. The target[key] = source[key] assignment triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the target object.
  6. The attacker-provided cookie attributes are added to the prototype of the merged attributes object.
  7. The set() function enumerates the merged object and includes the attacker-injected attributes in the Set-Cookie header.
  8. The browser receives the Set-Cookie header with the attacker-controlled attributes, potentially leading to session hijacking or other security issues.

Impact

Applications that use js-cookie and forward JSON-derived objects as the attributes argument to Cookies.set, Cookies.remove, Cookies.withAttributes, or Cookies.withConverter are vulnerable. This pattern is common when cookie configurations are loaded from backend APIs. Successful exploitation allows attackers to control cookie attributes like domain, secure, and samesite, potentially leading to cross-site scripting (XSS) or session fixation attacks. A sample payload {"__proto__":{"domain":"evil.example","secure":"false","samesite":"None"}} results in cookies being set for the attacker’s domain.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade to a patched version of js-cookie that addresses the prototype pollution vulnerability.
  • Apply the patch suggested in the advisory to src/assign.mjs to prevent the __proto__ property from being processed.
  • Implement input validation to sanitize or reject JSON payloads containing the __proto__ property before they are used as cookie attributes.
  • Deploy the Sigma rule “Detect Prototype Pollution via JSON proto Attribute in js-cookie” to identify exploitation attempts.
  • Review and audit existing code that uses js-cookie to ensure that JSON-derived objects are not directly passed as cookie attributes.
]]>highadvisoryprototype-pollutionjavascriptcookieCVE-2026-46625