{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/cmd/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["m365_defender","SentinelOne Cloud Funnel","Microsoft Defender XDR","Elastic Endgame"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["malware","execution","cmd"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Elastic","Microsoft","SentinelOne","Crowdstrike"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection identifies suspicious uses of the Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe), a common technique employed by malware and attackers. The rule focuses on identifying cmd.exe processes launched with specific argument patterns known to be associated with malicious activities such as downloading and executing payloads, bypassing security controls, or obfuscating commands. This rule helps defenders identify potential malware infections or suspicious behavior that may indicate an active attack. The rule leverages a broad range of data sources including Windows Security Event Logs, Sysmon, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender XDR, Elastic Endgame, and Crowdstrike to improve detection coverage and fidelity. By focusing on suspicious command-line arguments and parent-child process relationships, it aims to reduce false positives while maintaining a high level of detection efficacy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access via an exploit or social engineering.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses cmd.exe to execute a command containing suspicious arguments, such as those used for downloading files (e.g., \u003ccode\u003ecurl\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eInvoke-WebRequest\u003c/code\u003e) or bypassing security restrictions (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eActiveXObject\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCmd.exe may be used to echo commands to a file and then execute the file with wscript.exe or mshta.exe\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCmd.exe might invoke explorer.exe with command line arguments to browse to a malicious network share using WebDav (\u003ccode\u003eDavWWWRoot\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCmd.exe executes commands to disable security features or modify system configurations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCmd.exe uses \u003ccode\u003ecopy /b\u003c/code\u003e to concatenate files from a network location to evade detection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCmd.exe executes a script or binary downloaded in the previous steps.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe final objective can vary, but often includes lateral movement, data exfiltration, or deployment of ransomware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution, allowing attackers to compromise systems, steal sensitive data, or disrupt operations. This is a common early-stage technique, so early detection is crucial to prevent further damage. Undetected malicious command shell usage can lead to widespread infection and significant financial and reputational damage.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eSuspicious Cmd.exe Activity with Encoded or Obfuscated Arguments\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging to capture the command-line arguments used by cmd.exe.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by this rule, focusing on the parent process, command-line arguments, and network connections.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eCmd.exe with Suspicious Parent Process\u003c/code\u003e to detect unusual parent-child relationships involving cmd.exe.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and harden endpoint security policies to restrict the execution of cmd.exe in non-standard locations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor network traffic for connections originating from cmd.exe to external or suspicious IPs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-10-26T14:23:00Z","date_published":"2024-10-26T14:23:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-10-susp-cmd-args/","summary":"This rule identifies the execution of the Windows Command Shell process (cmd.exe) with suspicious argument values, often observed during malware installation.","title":"Suspicious Windows Command Shell Arguments Detection","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-10-susp-cmd-args/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Cmd","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}